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THESIS ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Eugene Peter Jarrett Pomeroy for the 
Master of Arts in History presented October 14, 1994. 
Title: The Origins and Development of the Defense Forces of 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia from 1890 to 1945 
This thesis examines Northern and Southern Rhodesia's history 
through the formation and development of their police and military 
units from the time Rhodesia was created in 1890 until the end of the 
Second World War. Southern Rhodesia, founded after a series of short 
and bloody frontier wars, was a self-governing British colony under a 
white minority and centered its peace-time security efforts around 
keeping an eye on potential uprisings from the African majority. White 
Northern Rhodesians viewed the African majority with similar 
suspicion although they were never able to exclude Africans from 
territorial defense. Northern Rhodesia was governed from London and 
ultimate power did not lie with the settler community. 
The importance of the Second World War for Southern Rhodesia 
is that, because of British strategic policies, Rhodesians received 
perhaps the widest possible military exposure of any allied nation of 
the War. Because of a lingering hostility and suspicion by the Union of 
South Africa, Britain's prewar plans for defending their African empire 
were centered on making use of the skilled white manpower of 
Rhodesia and Kenya. Added to this was the willingness and apparent 
positive reception by white Rhodesians of black units in the Southern 
Rhodesian army, a break with the exclusively all-white tradition that 
prevailed up until then. 
2 
The political capital accrued to Southern Rhodesia because of its 
close cooperation with Britain was perhaps the significant factor in the 
establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 
which included Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Federation was 
Southern Rhodesia's supreme political achievement and the closest it 
came to legal independence and international respectability. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1991 the RAND Corporation's Arroyo Center, which is funded 
by the United States Army as their research and development center, 
issued a report on the Rhodesian counterinsurgency campaign which 
began in 1972 and lasted until 1980 when white minority rule came to 
an end with the creation of Zimbabwe. The aim was to compare 
Rhodesia's experience with America's in El Salvador and Vietnam. 
What the authors found was that many of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Rhodesians reflected much of what had been 
acquired before and during the Second World War. 1 
How was it that a small country in south central Africa, ruled by a 
small white minority, was able to do this? The fact that Rhodesia has 
passed into history does not diminish from its military 
accomplishments. 2 From the arrival of the Pioneer Column in 1890, 
defense, to a greater or lesser degree, concerned the settler 
community and their descendants. 
This thesis follows the development of Southern Rhodesia's 
defense forces from the arrival of the settlers in 1890 until the end of 
1 For the sake of simplicity and brevity, 'Rhodesian' will always refer to the 
white population. 
2 The black-ruled nation now known as Zimbabwe was Southern Rhodesia from 
the 1890s until 1964. In that year Northern Rhodesia became Zambia and the 
'Southern' prefix was dropped from Rhodesia's name. Nyasaland is now Malawi. 
2 
the Second World War in 1945 at which time Southern Rhodesia was 
to enter a new era as the 'senior partner' of the Central African 
Federation. This study deals almost exclusively with the military 
aspects of Rhodesian history between 1890 and 1945 but does not 
attempt to find explanations for broader social and political 
developments which have been dealt with more extensively than here. 
From 1890 until the defense buildup of the 1930s, Rhodesians' 
military fears and prejudices were, with the exception of the Boer War 
and First World War, primarily directed at the larger African 
population. After 1935 and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Southern 
Rhodesia entered a defense agreement with Britain which completely 
altered the focus and direction of Southern Rhodesia's defense force 
from the perceived internal threat to the wider external threat. 
This study is divided up into headings according to the military 
unit being examined and attempts follows a chronological format 
inasmuch as that is possible. The original intent was to examine just 
the Rhodesian Army and its origins, but this proved to be impossible 
as the defense of Southern Rhodesia was largely in the hands of the 
territory's police until well after the founding of the army in 1926. 
Similarly, leaving out the air force, military developments in 
neighboring Northern Rhodesia, or the influence of the African 
Colonial Forces or the Union Defense Force would have left an 
incomplete picture. 3 
The controversial issue of having Africans serving in the armed 
3 The Union Defense Force was the Union of South Africa's armed forces. When 
South Africa became a republic in 1961, the name was changed to the South African 
Defense Force. It has undergone another name change, to the National Defense Force, 
since the advent of majority rule in April 1994. 
forces, a normal practice in the rest of colonial Africa including those 
territories with a significant settler population, specifically Northern 
Rhodesia and Kenya, was expressly forbidden in white-dominated 
Southern Rhodesia. The founding, disbanding and refounding of 
Southern Rhodesia's black forces will be examined as will the ideal 
and reality of having an all-white army in a country with a minuscule 
white population. 
3 
The other area that will be examined is the coming of the 
Second World War and its profound effect on Southern Rhodesia's 
military development. In the face of the potential Italian threat from 
Ethiopia, the territory's army and air force became an integral part of 
Britain's defense plans for Africa and both expanded enormously in 
scope and size to meet these demands. The territory also became one 
of the homes of the Empire Air Training Plan which trained thousands 
of British and Commonwealth air crew during the war. 
The intimacy of Anglo-Rhodesian defense cooperation contrasts 
sharply with the hostility between the Union of South Africa and 
Britain during the prewar period. That Britain should have turned to 
South Africa for an alliance during this period seems to be highly 
logical except when one remembers that the Afrikaner-dominated 
Union was home to long and bitter memories of wars with Great 
Britain. The Afrikaners, having lost the military struggle for 
independence in South Africa, were now masters of the Union and for 
many of them Britain was still the enemy. This did not prevent 
Southern Rhodesia and the Union from cooperating once the Second 
World War broke out. 
In 1945 Southern Rhodesia found itself in a very advantageous 
4 
political position due primarily to its intimate military relationship 
with Great Britain before and during the war. Within ten years of the 
end of the war, Southern Rhodesia was to become the dominant 
partner in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.4 As part of 
Britain's post-war strategy, the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Army (R&N 
Army) and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) were included in 
British defense plans for the Middle East. This subsequent period is 
outside of the scope of this study, but will be frequently referred to. 
Britain was going through the process of reorganizing and then 
retreating from her empire during the height of the Federation. The 
final period began after UDI, the establishment of the Rhodesian 
republic and the Chimurenga War which saw the end of white rule and 
the establishment of Zimbabwe. 5 
The change in attitude about Africans, who were the primary 
focus of Southern Rhodesia's defense worries, came about as a result of 
the Second World War. It was a war, it seemed, in which all of the 
races of the British Empire came together to fight the twin evils of 
fascism and Japanese expansionism. Just as the emerging world order 
of the 1940s and 1950s gave Americans, and the rest of the Western 
World, a sense of opportunity, destiny and greatness, so too was 
Rhodesia caught up with euphoria for the future where everything was 
possible. Not only had Rhodesia taken on England's enemies as her 
4 The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, also known as the Central African 
Federation, was formed by uniting the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, the 
British-ruled possessions of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland into a loose federal 
structure that lasted from 1953 until 1963. 
5 UDI, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence was declared by the 
Rhodesian Front government of Prime Minister Ian Smith on November 11th, 1965. 
Rhodesia became a republic in 1970. Chimurenga is the Shona word for freedom. 
5 
own, but Rhodesians seemed to have found a solution to the perennial 
and vexing problem of race relations. 6 The following passage from the 
official war history of Southern Rhodesia, published shortly after the 
war, exudes this confidence. Optimism in the future and faith in the 
past shows on every page and there is an unshakable belief in the 
cause for which they fought and sacrificed: 
For how has our own country come out of a struggle in which so 
much was given? Before the war "Rhodesian" was a word little 
used or understood elsewhere. Now it is arousing interest 
throughout the Commonwealth and the world. The great 
resources of the land are being assessed, its future planned in a 
manner that must benefit all the races living here. In helping to 
save freedom once again by the valor of arms, our fighting men 
have opened our country to new horizons and won wide 
experience, practical and spiritual, for the generation that must 
guide us out of our small estate into a great inheritance. 7 
6 "It was Lord Malvern (then Sir Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern 
Rhodesia and later to become first Prime Minister of the Federation) who said: 
"England's wars are our wars," and it was the late Admiral Sir Campbell Tait, when 
Governor of Southern Rhodesia, who stated with naval precision: "We are all of one 
company." W.V. Brelsford, Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, p. 
666. 
7 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 2, p. 673. 
CHAPTER II 
IN THE BEGINNING 
Southern Rhodesia's frontier period was as colorful, exciting and 
as controversial as the American frontier only shorter in duration. The 
pattern of occupation, native uprising and reconquest was compressed 
into an eight year period starting in 1890, so that by 1898 Southern 
Rhodesia was firmly under the control of the British South Africa 
Company, the 'Chartered Company', which had been founded by Cecil 
Rhodes in 1889 for the express purpose of bringing the lands north of 
the Limpopo into the British Empire. By making British conquest a 
function of private enterprise, Rhodes was given a freer hand than if it 
had been undertaken by a reluctant British Government. However, as 
Britain had long experience with this kind of colonial money making 
venture, they did not grant a totally free hand to the Chartered 
Company. 
Unlike the experience in other European countries where there 
was considerable government interference and control, British 
colonies were expected, for the most part, to look after themselves, to 
succeed or fail according to their own merits unless there was an 
overriding strategic reason for their maintenance and protection. The 
drain on the treasury during its colonizing efforts in Ireland in the 
sixteenth century had discouraged English, and later British 
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governments from officially sponsored settlement schemes. 1 The 
English hit upon the idea of privatizing colonial ventures; joint-stock 
companies and individuals were given land grants, which the Crown 
would protect against foreign aggression, but not financial failure. 2 The 
Charter system of settlement was thus inaugurated, in which the 
Crown allowed the company to rule a territocy. "Instructions" were 
provided for the colony's entire judicial, commercial, and adminis-
trative structure. This meant that English, and later the British, 
Governments could always ensure that English law was not being 
trampled on by some distant colonial despot. 
It also meant that the colonies and settlements could and did go 
through some hard times in their early years, to include, in the case of 
the very early settlements in the Americas, starvation and the financial 
collapse of the chartered companies. The end result was that the 
economic and political base of the colonies, with experience and a 
little marketing salesmanship, became broader and undoubtedly more 
realistic than the colonies of the other European nations.3 For Britain 
the mere acquisition of territocy was less important than the benefits 
1 'Colony', 'plantation', 'native' and 'planting' first entered the English imperial 
vocabulruy at this time. The Beginnings of English Colonization, The Cambrid~e 
Historv of the British Empire, Vol. 1, pp. 56-57. 
2 The Cambrtdee Historv of the British Empire, p. 77 -78. 
3 "Jamaica was the first of our colonies to be planted and developed by the State, 
and the State had to learn by trial and error the business in which private enterprise 
was now fairly expert, but in which it had bought painful experience in the days of 
Virginia. When the course of the undertaking is compared with the contemporaneous 
story of Surinam, a surprising contrast is apparent. On the Surinam plantation there 
was no public expenditure, and the inhabitants, with some assistance from Lord 
Willoughby, quickly became self-supporting; neither is there any record of serious 
disasters during the formative period. In Jamaica, on the other hand, despondency and 
apathy overhung the colony like a cloud." The Beginnings of an Imperial Policy, The 
Cambrid~e Hist01y of the British Empire, Vol. 1, p. 232. 
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accrued to the nation and her subjects in the pursuit of trade. In order 
to secure that, the rule of law had to remain as supreme as possible. 
The settlers ultimately aspired to, and almost always got, 
territorial self-rule under the aegis of the British crown. As with 
British settler colonies since Jamestown, Southern Rhodesia was no 
different and self-government was granted to the Rhodesians in 1923. 
All internal power devolved from the parliament in Salisbury and the 
Governor ultimately became little more than a figurehead. The right to 
territorial self-defense was placed firmly in the hands of the 
Rhodesians. 
The citizen militias that were raised to defend the early 
settlements against the native uprisings were part of this frontier 
tradition that has lost nothing in their drama with the passage of time. 
Historians of the American frontier will recognize the style and form, 
if not the context, of the central African frontier: 
The Matabele War was fought by Rhodesian volunteers with one 
Imperial unit, the Bechuanaland Border Police. The volunteers 
were the Salisbury Horse, Victoria Rangers and Raffs Rangers 
operating in two columns, the Salisbury Horse and Victoria 
Rangers operating together as one column and Raff s Rangers 
and the Bechuanaland Border Police together as the other for 
the advance on Lobengula's kraal ... 4 
Southern Rhodesia's military lore and foundation myths, 
important elements in a nation's popular perception of itself, were 
enhanced by incidents like the last stand of the Wilson Patrol on the 
Shangani River in December 1893 against the retreating Matabele 
impis of King Lobengula, or the tales of bravery and isolation against 
overwhelming odds at the Alice Mine in Mazoe in 1896. Because of 
4 A Brief History of the Rhodesia Army, pp. 1-2. 
this frontier tradition, the idea of raising African units beyond what 
was necessary for the maintenance of law and order in the tribal 
reserves was anathema when the question arose in the First World 
War: 
9 
The risings of 1896-97 were still fresh in the minds of the 
settler community, which had been literally decimated by the 
Shona and Ndebele rebels. Large numbers of the Matabele Native 
Police had defected at the outset of the risings, sowing the 
seeds of mistrust at arming and training Africans for modern 
warfare. It was feared that African troops with their military 
training could form the deadly core of future risings. 5 
Despite this, an African battalion was raised but quickly 
disbanded at the end of the war. When the question arose again in the 
Second World War, the white manpower shortage and the passage of 
time allowed the military authorities in Southern Rhodesia to repeat 
the experiment and Southern Rhodesia broke with her short military 
past. 
5 Peter McLaughlin, Ra~time Soldiers. The Rhodesian Experience in the First 
W>rld War, pp. 73-7 4. 
CHAPTER III 
SOUTHERN RHODESIA'S FIRST ARMY; 
the British South Africa Police, 1890-1926 
The police forces of the British South Africa Company were 
formed for the express purpose of establishing Pax Britannica and all 
of its ramifications in the territories granted to Cecil Rhodes' and his 
associates. In Southern Rhodesia this force was the British South 
Africa Company Police which eventually became the British South 
Africa Police (BSAP). The BSAC was not allowed to raise a military 
force under terms of its charter with the result that in both Northern 
and Southern Rhodesia, police forces had a defense as well as a law 
and order role. In addition to this minor problem in semantics, the 
British did not exercise direct control over the Company's police in 
the early days. The result was conflict with the Africans and an 
international border incident with the Transvaalers. 
When a territory was formed and brought under British rule, its 
police came under direct British control. It was always recognized that 
colonial police forces should uphold the law: 
British colonial policy generally attempted to develop in colonies 
those institutions and organizations with records of success and 
acceptability in the United Kingdom. The authorities recognized 
that these might have to be modified to suit local conditions, but 
their aim remained to create institutions as largely British as 
possible. 1 
1 Clayton & Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial 
Africa, p. 4. 
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British colonial administrators drew from the experiences and 
traditions of the mother country where two distinct traditions had 
developed. The first is the English tradition where the policeman 
generally represents and is responsible to the local community in 
which he serves, protecting the citizenry from harm and catching 
criminals. He is also responsible for his actions and is in no way above 
the law himself. 
This model depends on a public consensus and generally agreed 
norms of social behavior. The British accepted the necessity for 
modification of the concept for an interim period, hopefully 
short, as it was transferred to colonial possessions of different 
traditions and attitudes, at lower levels of political and social 
development. The imposition of a new and strange culture would 
require the constabulary concept to strengthen, in particular, its 
capacity to contain unrest and keep order; the forces, therefore, 
would need to make provision for occasional deployments in 
gendarmerie and frontier military roles. 2 
The police in British Africa came from the tradition that 
developed in Ireland with the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), which 
had strong military overtones. The chief difference between the 
English and Irish models were that the RIC existed as an extension of 
the central government rather than local authorities. Like many 
continental European police forces, this arrangement gave the force a 
paramilitary cast, and indeed the RIC, and later the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), received military training. 
A disproportionate number of colonial police officers, including 
a number of the best, were Irishmen. These two traditions and 
the RIC, might have been difficult to align; however, this was not 
the case. The various British-controlled Indian police forces, 
organized in a way incorporating elements from both these 
2 Clayton & Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial 
Africa, pp. 5-6. 
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traditions, were very successful. 3 
This was the model that prevailed in the police forces in British 
Africa. Americans are benefactors of the English rather than the Irish 
tradition, and a glance around the British Empire, and the states that 
emerged from it, will give a good idea as to which forces fall into one 
or other or a combination of these categories. 
Like the other forces in Africa the British South Africa Police fell 
into the RIC/RUC category. However, the ideals of British policing 
were bound to clash with Rhodesia's frontier society. In its early days 
the Company's police force reflected the aspirations of the settlers 
and " ... in 1914 the BSAP was still looked on as Rhodesia's first line of 
defense. "4 rather than a purely Law-and-Order organization. Many 
Rhodesians came from South Africa and inherited a frontier tradition 
of hostility towards Africans. They were leery of having any African 
force around them, armed or otherwise, as was the case with the 
Northern Rhodesia Police which will be dealt with later. 
When the Pioneer Column moved into what was to become 
Southern Rhodesia in 1890, it came not only as a vanguard of South 
African settlement, but it represented the desires and ambitions of a 
wealthy and powerful visionary, an unstoppable combination in those 
days: 
[Rhodes'] column was well equipped, and combined the military 
technology of the South African backwoods with that of the 
industrial revolution. There were 84 great lumbering ox wagons 
to carry the pioneers and their belongings. Their crews were 
carefully trained to maneuver with military precision and form 
3 Clayton & Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial 
Africa, pp. 5-6. 
4 Peter Gibbs, The History of the BSAP, Vol. 2, p. 100. 
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mobile pivots to support mounted riflemen in the event of 
attacks by African warriors. There was also a traction engine, a 
steam-driven generator to operate an electric searchlight, 
machine guns and light artillery. Hence Lobengula, the ruler of 
the great Matabele warrior kingdom in what is now Rhodesia, 
hesitated to assault the column. 5 
The Pioneer Column broke up when the flag was raised at Fort 
Salisbury in September 1890 and the British South Africa Company's 
Police " ... which had been established on the lines of a British mounted 
infantry regiment ... " had as its first commanding officer a seconded 
Lieutenant-Colonel from the 6th lnniskilling Dragoons, an Irish 
regiment which provided many military appointments in southern 
Africa. 
Initially a detachment of 100 was enrolled, largely from the 
Bechuanaland Border Police, but the strength was subsequently 
increased for the march into Mashonaland to 500.6 
The ad hoc nature of the Company's police in the early days 
seems to be emphasized by the inconsistent numbers given in 
different sources as to its size and organization. In 1892 the company 
drastically reduced the size of their police force. 1 The financial drain 
of the force on the Chartered Company and the 3,000 settlers was 
considerable, amounting as it did to around twenty percent of the 
white population.8 It was rearmed and rebuilt for the showdown with 
5 L.H. Gann, From Ox Wagon to Armored Car in Rhodesia, Military Review, pp. 
63-64. 
6 A Brief History of the Rhodesia Army, p. 1. 
7 Di Perna gives the numbers as going from 600 to 40, Gibbs puts the numbers as 
650 to 150 and A Brief History of the Rhodesia Army gives the numbers as 500 and 150 
with a 40 man Town Police Force. 
8 Anthony Di Perna, A Ri~ht to be Proud, p. 19. 
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the Ndebele (or 'Matabele' as the settlers called them) from amongst 
the settlers. A range of settler militia units were raised obviating the 
need for Imperial troops, which they did not want anyway " ... because 
they feared interference in Company affairs."9 Despite a relatively clear 
field and the absence of British interference in their affairs, the 
grievances of the Ndebele against the early practices of the Company's 
police, were a factor that could not be disregarded if Rhodesia was to 
be a profitable and well run country. The hunter and famous tracker, 
Frederick Courtney Selous ... 
... described the complaints made to him by a Matabele induna, 
who spoke bitterly " ... of the high-handed manner in which the 
Arna Policey Minyama, the 'Black Police', behaved to him and his 
people." To Selous, it was the over-zealous native police who 
were sent to the kraals to obtain native labor that brought on the 
uprising in Matabeleland. 10 
The absence of British units in the Matabele War of 1892-93 and 
the Mashona/Matabele Rebellion of 1896-97 may have meant that 
BSAC control over Southern Rhodesia was more absolute than it would 
have been had the British become involved, but it also meant that 
Southern Rhodesia's police would have to change. This finally 
happened in 1896 when Leander Starr Jameson, 'The Doctor', the 
Company's Chief Executive Officer, in a colorful reinterpretation of the 
corporate takeover, led seven-eighths of the Rhodesia Mounted Police 
" ... on a buccaneering expedition which came to be known as the 
Jameson Raid, leaving no more than about 80 men to police the whole 
9 Anthony Di Perna, A ~ht to be Proud, p. 27. 
10 Anthony Di Perna, A Riiht to be Proud, p. 30. 
of Rhodesia. "11 Their efforts to rewrite South African history failed 
miserably, and they were arrested on New Year's Day upon arrival in 
the Transvaal, then known as the South African Republic, and 
15 
deported to England, bringing Rhodesia to the attention of the British 
Government in a none too positive light. In March of that same year, 
rebellion broke out in Matabeleland and while it ended in August with 
Rhodes' personally negotiating with the Ndebele Chiefs in the Matopo 
Hills, it meant a temporary end of Company control over Southern 
Rhodesia's police. In October the BSAP was founded from the 
Company's police and the rebellion, which by now had spread to 
Mashonaland, was dealt with and eventually put down by them a year 
later in 1897. The British Government took control of the BSAP 
reorganizing it into four divisions which they " ... virtually imposed on 
the Company as a safeguard against a repetition of irresponsible 
adventures. "12 It implemented a policy of recruiting from the British 
middle classes, ensuring a supply of quality men with no separate class 
distinctions. 13 It was on the road to becoming a professional force 
according to the Irish model: 
... expanded by recruitment from Britain and South Africa to a 
white force of some four or five hundred strong, backed by a 
force of similar strength of locally enlisted native policemen -
popularly known as "the Black Watch. 14 
11 Peter Gibbs, The History of the BSAP, Vol. 2, p. 3. 
12 Peter Gibbs, The History of the BSAP, Vol. 2, p. 4. 
13 "Similarly the Southern Rhodesian civil service did not have the British Civil 
Service division into "Administrative Class" (equal socially to officers, university 
educated); "Executive" (equal to warrant officers and sergeants) and "Clerical" 
(ordinary enlisted men)." Letter from Dr. L.H. Gann, September 9th, 1994. 
14 Peter Gibbs, The History of the BSAP, Vol. 2, p. 4. 
Southern Rhodesia's police now followed a rather tortured 
administrative path. The "buccaneering" days of Jameson were over 
and between 1898 and 1909 there were what was described as 
16 
" ... three stages of transition ... " in the life of the BSAP. 15 The Resident-
Commissioner of Southern Rhodesia and the Commandant-General of 
the BSAP became distinct offices but both were now "Imperial" or 
British officers with responsibility to London and there was only one 
police force in the territory. The Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, 
the Chartered Company's man on the spot, had control over the 
citizen volunteers, except when they went on 'active service', that is 
on military operations, and then they came under an officer appointed 
by the Commandant-General who had supreme military command and 
control of operations. 16 
The next stage went from 1904 until 1909. In 1905 the offices 
of Resident-Commissioner and Commandant-General were combined, 
giving Britain the highest degree of control over the political and 
military affairs of Southern Rhodesia that she was ever to exercise. 
There now came into existence a second police force, the 
Southern Rhodesia Constabulary (SRC), which was established by the 
Police Ordinance of 1903. This force came under the control of a 
Superintendent appointed by the Administrator and it was controlled 
by the Attorney General. The SRC, formed by joining together the 
Town Police of Bulawayo and Salisbury in 1903, was dedicated to the 
15 Remarks on Report dated October 13th. 1911 by Inspector-General of Oversea 
Forces, p. 6. PRO DO 119/878. 
16 Remarks on Report dated October 13th. 1911 by Insoector-General of Oversea 
Forces, p. 6. PRO DO 119/878. 
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mundane business of law enforcement in the small towns of Southern 
Rhodesia. 17 Because it had no military functions. the British 
Government allowed the Chartered Company to control it. This was a 
civil police force in the true sense of the word and did not come 
under the Commandant-General of the BSAP, except if it was 
" ... employed for military purposes then it was to come under such 
regulations as the High Commissioner might determine." 18 
From 1909 onwards the duties of Commandant-General of the 
BSAP and Resident-Commissioner were still combined, but were 
limited in peacetime to " ... the right of inspecting at all times any 
police or volunteer force. "19 Imperial control was slipping away and 
there was no longer any 'immediate' command of the BSAP or control 
of either police or volunteers by the Resident-Commissioner " ... except 
in the event of military operations when he assumes the chief 
command but not necessarily the immediate command, of any police 
or volunteers employed thereon. "20 As a means of keeping an eye on 
the state of affairs in the tribal areas, the BSAP had become a more 
professional force: 
[They] relied on a small, but capable, mounted police force 
17Rhodesia had many aspects of a typical frontier society; "But there was already 
a surprising proportion ofless worthy citizens; and the cases reported in those earlier 
days in the Bulawayo and Salisbury newspapers, of whites prosecuted for a colorful 
range of crimes bid fair to rival in number and variety the reports in the same papers 
today when the white population population is twenty times the size." Peter Gibbs' The 
History of the BSAP. Vol. 2, Ch. 4. 
18 Remarks on Reoort dated October 13th. 1911 by Inspector-General of Oversea 
Forces, pp. 6-7. PRO DO 119/878. 
19 Remarks on Reoort dated October 13th. 1911 by Inspector-General of Oversea 
Forces, p. 7. PRO DO 119/878. 
20 Remarks on Reoort dated October 13th. 1911 by Inspector-General of Oversea 
Forces, p. 7. PRO DO 119/878. 
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which served as the country's first line of offense. The police, a 
highly professional body, built up an efficient intelligence 
network. The countryside was effectively controlled by posts and 
patrols, and the police relied on the principle of prevention 
instead of repression. At the same time, the Chartered Company 
instituted many administrative and economic reforms. These 
were so effective that there were no further armed risings. 21 
As a result, Southern Rhodesia was able " ... to send the bulk of 
their fighting men out of the colony to fight on the British side during 
the [Boer War] ... and the First and Second World Wars. "22 The fact that 
the BSAP was still organized as a military unit was one of the problems 
that London, and later Salisbury, had to wrestle with. The paramilitary 
nature of the BSAP, and the fact that it ceased being the colony's first 
line of defense after 1926 when Southern Rhodesia's army was 
created, could only mean that the police's residual military functions 
would conflict with those of the army. When the SRC was absorbed 
into the BSAP and both were returned to Chartered Company control, 
" ... the presumption that the BSAP was a military and not a civil force 
would not have died so hard, and the disruptive cleavage between 
Town and District would not have persisted as long as it did after the 
final amalgamation in 1909."23 This way of thinking also could only 
have a detrimental effect on the conduct of military operations if and 
when the police would have to work with the army and air force: 
63-72. 
63-72. 
The BSAP, of course, looked on themselves even as late as 1950 
as the frrst line of defense. Indeed mounted infantry drills were 
still being taught as part of basic training at the time. In fact, 
21 L.H. Gann, From Ox Wagon to Armored Car in Rhodesia, Military Review, pp. 
22 L.H. Gann, From Ox Wagon to Armored Car in Rhodesia, Military Review, pp. 
23 Peter Gibbs, The History of the BSAP, Vol. 2, pp. 17-18. 
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then, they probably were numerically the strongest disciplined 
(white) regular force in the country although by now much more 
policemen than soldiers. 24 
However, aside from the problems associated with having their 
police force under British control, or with the dual nature of the BSAP, 
there was the fact that, as a financial proposition, neither of the 
Rhodesias were as financially successful as had been hoped. The police 
came under pressure to cut costs, but these propositions came into 
conflict with the goal of the settlers to have a force that reflected their 
desires and aspirations. In September 1904, Lord Milner, the High 
Commissioner in Cape Town, sent a letter to the Rhodesian 
Administrator, Sir William Milton which contained the following ideas: 
Any retrenchment effected during recent years, has been chiefly 
at the cost of the BSAP and I do not think that the present 
expenditure on that force is excessive .... In order to protect a 
settled white population a regular force always equipped and 
ready, which can be sent anywhere at short notice, is essential, 
and I think that the bulk at any rate of that force should be 
white .... Having regard to the extreme gravity of the financial 
position, I am prepared to try the experiment of substituting 
100 Basutos for an equal number of whites. 25 
The thought of having the force diluted of its white members 
was a little short of heresy to the settlers. The High Commissioner was 
proposing something that worked well in a territory with no settlers 
or, as was the case in Kenya, where white settlement had come as a 
peaceful afterthought to the establishment of British rule by British 
24 Letter from Colonel Welch dated August 28, 1993. As a Major in the Rhodesia & 
Nyasaland Army, Curt Welch was the first Commanding Officer of 'C' Squadron, 
Rhodesian Special Air SeIVice Regiment when it was reestablished in 1961 as a regular 
unit. Major Welch left Rhodesia in 1963 when the Federation broke up and completed 
his career with the British Army. 
25 Peter Gibbs, The History of the BSAP, Vol. 2, p. 18. 
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and not settler forces. In Kenya the territory's military and police 
forces were neither controlled nor manned by settlers, but Rhodesia, 
or at least Southern Rhodesia, was conquered by settlers and was 
therefore 'White Man's Country'. There would be no compromising on 
the issue of arming Africans, or not having an indigenous white police 
force. 
Even after the BSAP reverted to Company control, the British 
Government, as grantor of the Company's charter, insisted on 
retaining ultimate control with the appointment of an Inspector-
General of Oversea Forces, General Sir Ian Hamilton, to report on the 
state of Rhodesia's defense.26 His 'General Observations' and the point 
by point response by the Dominion Office is a good illustration of the 
differences in attitudes about Rhodesia shown over the years between 
British Government officials and British soldiers. The soldiers are 
obviously sympathetic, and identify with Rhodesia: 
Progress, activity, enterprise are in evidence everywhere 
throughout the domains of the British South Africa Company. 
Population multiplies, business booms. Only in the military 
sphere do these vivifying influences seem at present to hang 
fire. The armed force - the war strength - of the country is 
stagnant. . . 21 
The British politicians and civil servants were less impressed. 
The somewhat dry response by the Dominion Office, begins by stating 
that " ... Sir Ian Hamilton presents an interesting picture left on his 
mind by a brief and much occupied visit of the conditions and 
prospects of Southern Rhodesia, which is not perhaps a wholly 
26 Peter Gibbs, The History of the BSAP, Vol. 2, p. 80. 
27 Reoort bv the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces on Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia, p. 2. PRO DO 119/878. 
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trustworthy basis for the recommendations which follow."28 
Only in a very few centers and districts have there been as yet 
enterprise and development. Rhodesia, and especially Southern 
Rhodesia, is making good progress ... But it is hardly correct to 
speak of an inflowing tide of humanity and unprotected wealth. 
Further, I think the references to the stagnation of war strength 
and the simplicity of the problem, without some qualification, 
are misleading. 29 
The difference is never more striking than the contrast of 
opinion over the the threat of trouble from the Africans. British 
officialdom, even at this early stage, was beginning to show itself 
divided in its evaluations of the Rhodesians and their worth to the 
British. Sir Ian Hamilton continues: 
... the first point I wish to put forward and to emphasize is my 
conviction that in no part of the British Empire does the true 
voluntary spirit, the individual readiness to bear arms, show up 
better than it does in the territories immediately south of the 
Zambezi. Equally am I convinced that nowhere in the world does 
a finer, more manly, and by nature more soldierly type of man 
exist than is to be found throughout Rhodesia. 30 
This seems to be the first evidence of the admiration that British 
soldiers have held for Rhodesians, of their military qualities and 
potential which became stronger with the passage of time. 31 
The African threat also comes in for differing interpretations, 
with Sir Ian Hamilton incorporating the Rhodesian point of view into 
28 Remarks on Report dated October 13th. 1911 by Inspector-General of Oversea 
Forces, p. 1. PRO 00 119/878. 
29 Remarks on Report dated October 13th. 1911 by Inspector -General of Oversea 
Forces, p. 2. PRO DO 119/878. 
30 Reoort by the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces on Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia, p. 4. PRO DO 119/878. 
31 "His men were all Rhodesians, tough, self-reliant and taciturn men to whom 
the open air life was second nature." Anthony Kemp, The SAS at War. 1941-1945, p. 21. 
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his recommendations: 
They retain a vivid recollection of the events of 15 years ago, and 
can tell the younger settlers at first hand how the pioneers of 
civilization in Rhodesia had to fight for their very existence, and 
how many families and individuals in outlying stations paid with 
their lives the penalty of relying too implicitly upon the assumed 
timidity or forbearance of barbarians. 32 
The Dominion Office response dismisses this assessment and 
with it the urgency that there should be greater preparedness on the 
part of Southern Rhodesia's administration in the face of the potential 
African threat: 
I think, however, the Report exaggerates the danger of a 
possible rising. The Mashonas are not a fighting race. 
Unquestionably the Matabele have lost much of their fighting 
spirit since the rising in 1896. They have no leader. There are, 
so far as I can learn, no ominous signs of unrest. On the other 
hand the relative strength of the white population has greatly 
increased. 33 
The conclusions of both sides are also different in emphasis and 
direction. Sir Ian Hamilton felt that "Every European male citizen of 
mature years should by law be compelled to bear his part in the 
defense of the country ... "34 while the Dominion Office concluded, since 
most Rhodesians were frontiersmen anyway, that " .. .I do not see how 
these men can be expected to absent themselves for a period of 
training and to leave their wives and children and their farms 
32 Report by the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces on Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia, p. 2. PRO DO 119 I 878. 
33 Remarks on Report dated October 13th. 1911 by Inspector -General of Oversea 
Forces, pp. 2-3. PRO 00 119/878. 
34 Report by the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces on Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia, p. 16. PRO DO 119/878. 
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practically unprotected."35 As a nation in an early stage of its 
development, expenditure on defense beyond what was already in 
place, was undoubtedly seen as extravagant. Even the possibility of a 
war against Germany, alluded to by Sir Ian and mentioned briefly in 
the response with the words that ... "This is a matter for experts, and I 
submit it should be considered with the question of Protectorate 
defense after the Imperial troops are withdrawn from the Union [of 
South Africa] territories."36 There is no sense of urgency. 
The Inspector-General's report for 1913 reported " ... that the 
state of these forces, including the BSAP, was highly unsatisfactory."37 
Part of the reason may have been the poor state of the force as a purely 
law enforcement agency, "It cannot be said that the British South 
Africa Police are as efficient as they might be as a civil force, however 
excellent they may be as a fighting force!"38 It should be added that 
white society in Southern Rhodesia was in no way comparable to the 
American West as a law enforcement problem. The white population 
was small, there was little corruption in the civil service and there 
was white solidarity in the face of the African majority. 39 The British 
Government was preparing for the possibility of war with Germany and 
35 Remarks on Reoort dated October 13th. 1911 by Inspector-General of Oversea 
Forces, p. 15. PRO DO 119/878. 
36 Remarks on Reoort dated October 13th. 1911 by Inspector -General of Oversea 
Forces, p. 12. PRO DO 119/878. 
37 Peter Gibbs, The History of the BSAP, Vol. 2, p. 81. 
38 Remarks on Reoort dated October 13th, 1911 by Inspector-General of Oversea 
Forces, p. 12. PRO DO 119/878. 
39 Letter from Dr. L.H. Gann, September 9th, 1994. 
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the BSAP had to be prepared. 40 "As a Chartered Company the British 
South Africa Company was not authorized by the British Government 
to maintain military forces ... "41 ' but in time of war they could, and did 
come under Imperial control for this purpose. In the case of Rhodesia, 
it meant that control would be exercised over all of the uniformed 
forces of Rhodesia on both sides of the Zambezi. 
As Southern Rhodesia moved increasingly out of its frontier 
period and towards the First World War, its police also settled down 
and became a force according to the Irish model. The appointment of 
Major-General Sir A.H.M. Edwards, a retired soldier and former Chief 
Constable of the Metropolitan Police, as London's police force is 
known, as Commandant-General and Colonel Essex Capell, as his 
second-in-command, who also came from a military and colonial 
police background indicated the shift towards a more professional 
approach: 
[They] ... brought a wealth of much-needed experience to the 
service of the BSAP ... their preferment over even long-serving 
members of the force was in a very different category from those 
arbitrary appointments in the early days, which Rhodes had 
handed out indiscriminately to his influential friends. 42 
The outbreak of war with Germany saw Southern Rhodesia once 
more relying on the BSAP. The German garrison at Schuckmannsburg 
on the Caprivi Strip, the finger of German territory that stretched 
from the main body of the German colony of South West Africa to the 
40 Peter Gibbs, The Histocy of the BSAP, Vol. 2, p. 81. 
41 James Lunt, Imoerial Sunset: Frontier Soldierin~ in the 20th Century, pp. 
297-298. 
42 Peter Gibbs, The Histocy of the BSAP, Vol. 2, pp. 100-101. 
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Zambezi and bordered both Southern and Northern Rhodesia was seen 
as the most serious threat. In August and September the BSAP and the 
Northern Rhodesia Police mounted an operation against the Germans 
that resulted in a bloodless victory and surrender of the twenty-eight 
man German force. 43 
The next, and more renowned, BSAP contribution was "Murray's 
Column" which was raised to fight the Germans on the Northern 
Rhodesia/German East Africa border: 
The response was to raise what were called 'service companies', 
a force composed of a core of regular BSAP ('A' Company) with 
volunteers for active service from the Southern Rhodesia 
Volunteers ('B' Company). So hurried was this force's 
preparation that the men had no training; they were merely put 
through a shooting test. Although the training of the BSAP and 
the SRV was hardly adequate for a war against a sophisticated 
enemy like the Germans, 'A' Company was sped to Broken Hill 
in early 1915. From there the force, about a hundred strong, 
marched to Abercorn at an average of twenty-five kilometers a 
day over the five weeks needed for the journey. This was 
considered a prodigious feat, and the unit became renowned for 
its marching; General Northey, the officer commanding that 
operational zone, came to call it 'my light cavalry'. 'B' Company 
reached the north-eastern frontier via Beira, Chinde, the 
Zambezi and Lake Nyasa. 44 
Murray's Column was to suffer from the climate in what was to 
become Tanganyika and the German commander's strategy of tying 
down as many Allied soldiers as he could. General Paul von Lettow-
Vorbeck's strategy of drawing as many British and Imperial soldiers 
into German East Africa had a significant long term effect on 
Rhodesian military policy. 
43 Peter Gibbs, The History of the BSAP, Vol. 2, pp. 104-108. 
44 Peter McLaughlin, Ra"time Soldiers. The Rhodesian Experience in the First 
\\brld War, pp. 25-26. 
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From the end of the First World War onwards, the police was 
engaged in its law keeping and internal security role. While it 
remained the only large body of uniformed personnel within the 
colony, it came to be less of a military force than a police force, 
although it is clear that the line dividing the two was becoming more 
and more distinct by the 1920s. The country was secured by mounted 
police patrols who reported back to Salisbury: 
It is clear from these surviving reports that the concept of the 
patrols was based on the still lurking fear of risings in the native 
reserves, and a continuing belief - fathered by perhaps by a 
subconscious wish - that even though the [First World] war was 
over the BSAP's role was as military as it was civil. Headquarters 
had already set a belligerent tone, by listing the information 
which was to be collected by the patrol: the position of native 
strongholds and the best way to reach them; suitable positions 
for advanced bases; plans of attack. 45 
The challenge for the BSAP was somehow to remain Southern 
Rhodesia's first line of defense, yet fully develop as a police force. 
From the evidence, a chief problem seems to have been the lack of a 
clear vision of what the force's primary mission was. Its civil role was 
undoubtedly influenced by its continuing paramilitary role, in that it 
had to keep an eye on the Africans in the tribal areas who were seen as 
the future source of any trouble. This dual nature continued to plague 
the police for a long time to come. While the army grew in stature and 
experience because of experience gained through the Second World 
War, the Malayan Emergency and deployments in support of British 
policy in the Middle East, the BSAP remained within the borders of 
Southern Rhodesia and wedded to its traditional role. The fact that it 
was eclipsed by the army whose mission was unambiguously military 
45 Peter Gibbs, The History of the BSAP, Vol. 2, pp. 163-164. 
did nothing to diminish the BSAP's own view of itself as Rhodesia's 
first line of internal defense. 
27 
CHAPTER IV 
NORTHERN RHODESIA'S ARMY; 
Origins of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, 1891-1945 
Northern Rhodesia, like its namesake south of the Zambezi, was 
conceived of as another settler state. By 1923 Southern Rhodesia had 
fulfilled part of this vision by assuming self-government under settler 
rule. Northern Rhodesia, never able to indulge in the fantasy that it 
could become another dominion, as Southern Rhodesia was doing, 
became another territory ruled from the Colonial Office. As such, its 
defense needs clashed with settlers' fears and prejudices about armed 
Africans. As Northern Rhodesia was not as economically successful as 
Southern Rhodesia it could not ultimately afford the luxury of 
excluding Africans from the armed forces as their cousins were doing 
across the Zambezi. 
Northern Rhodesia began its existence as the two territories, 
North-Eastern Rhodesia and North-Western Rhodesia, and was only 
joined into a single administrative unit in 1911. While the legal 
occupation of Southern Rhodesia was completed by 1891, and the 
physical occupation completed by 1897, it was only in 1891 that the 
BSAC's charter was " ... extended to give it power to administer the 
territory north of the Zambezi. .. ". 1 The Chartered Company did not 
actually take control of the area until 1895, which was being patrolled 
1 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Re~iment, p. 1. 
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by military forces from the new British territory of Nyasaland. The 
suppression of the slave trade and the extension of the Pax Britannica 
in Northern Rhodesia was being done by forces ·· ... raised with the help 
of the Indian Government, and, although it was under the Imperial 
Commissioner of Nyasaland, it was also responsible for the protection 
of the Chartered Company's area"2 
Few Europeans chose to settle in Northern Rhodesia, an 
indication that the centuries of widespread rural Anglo-Saxon, and 
general European, territorial expansion was coming to an end. Even 
though the white population of Southern Rhodesia doubled and, at 
times even exceeded the African population growth rate, it could 
never hope to match the white proletarian demography of, for 
example, New Zealand. Even South Africa, whose white population 
exceeds that of New Zealand, had an African demographic •time-bomb' 
that would eventually make exclusive white rule impossible. 
The establishment of the borders of Northern Rhodesia was 
accomplished not by settlers, but by BSAC officials and police who 
moved north from Southern Rhodesia and east from British Central 
Africa, which was later renamed Nyasaland. The Germans, Belgians 
and Portuguese were thus prevented from moving into the territory 
and ..... Rhodes successfully enveloped his new slice of country ... "3 
The Northern Rhodesia Police reflected this lack of popular 
white settlement and it was, from its beginnings, a typical white-led 
force of askaris. It was formed by combining the North-Eastern 
2 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Re~iment, p. 3. 
3 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Re~iment, p. 1. 
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Rhodesia Constabulary and the Barotseland Native Police which were 
merged in December 1912 to become the Northern Rhodesia Police 
(NRP). 4 As the territory's only force, it performed, like the BSAP, a 
dual law enforcement and military role. The NRP took part in the 
campaign in German East Africa as an infantry battalion even while 
" ... the Northern Rhodesia Proclamation No. 17 of 1912 made it clear 
that in case of war the force could be employed lfor police or military 
purposes' within certain defined limits. "5 Because of its dual nature, 
the NRP maintained a Criminal Investigation branch, a Civil Police 
branch, and a Military branch until 1933 when the Northern Rhodesia 
Regiment (NRR) was formed from the Military branch. 
As had been the case with the BSAP before the First World War, 
the military nature of the NRP was also seen as a liability by its 
Commandant-General and in 1919-20 he wrote that "In a military 
police force the members of which have to perform the double duty of 
a soldier and a policeman, it is extremely difficult to attain and 
maintain efficiency on both sides. "6 The force " ... while well up and 
instructed in military work and duties are, with a few exceptions, 
totally ignorant of the requirements, etc., of civil police work. "7 would 
continue as a military force: 
298. 
As far as one can foresee at the moment, the military portion of 
the force will, for some considerable time to come, be greater 
and have more responsibilities that the civil division in respect 
4 James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century, pp. 297-
5 James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century, p. 298. 
6 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, p. 64. 
7 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, p. 64. 
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to maintaining law and order. This however, would be no excuse 
for neglecting to build up the latter, the value of which will each 
year become more marked as the territory becomes more 
civilized, and the number of European residents and settlers 
increases. As a matter of fact the work it has done and is doing 
already proves its raison d'etre. 8 
Northern Rhodesia was a frontier territory long after Southern 
Rhodesia had settled down to a more normal existence. "The gradual 
elimination of military ranks in the civil police and the substitution of 
civil police titles and grading is a subject that requires 
consideration. "9 This reflected not so much a 'Wild West' situation, but 
a lack of money and the fact that Northern Rhodesia was an economic 
backwater. 10 The economically unstable nature of Northern Rhodesia 
was reflected by the the continued existence of the NRP as a force 
which performed both police and military roles. After the separation 
of the military branch, the NRR continued to be administered under 
the Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance of 1926, unlike the system in 
the British colonial forces in east and west Africa: 11 
... until 1937 the Northern Rhodesia Regiment had its own 
permanent staff of officers, men who never left the Regiment 
and who were not liable for secondment either back to Britain 
or to other colonial units. Their salaries were paid by the 
8 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Re~iment, pp. 64-65. 
9 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Re~iment, p. 65. 
10 See Gann's A History of Northern Rhodesia, Chapter 3 for a description of the 
territory's white frontier before the First World War and the state of its finances. "The 
only people who were looking toward the Colonial Office for their salvation were the 
Northern Rhodesian settlers. Their descendants might find their attitude 
incomprehensible, but in 1919 an Imperial solution seemed good sense; Northern 
Rhodesia could not possibly finance its own expenditure ... " p. 182. 
11 James Lunt, Imoerial Sunset: Frontier Soldierin~ in the 20th Century, pp. 
298-299. 
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territory and they appeared in the civil service staff list. 12 
Seconded British officers to the African colonial forces were 
paid up to three times their normal salary with the difference between 
their British Army pay and their pay in Africa coming out of the 
colony's exchequer. 13 Northern Rhodesia's military situation made it 
unique among the African regiments. It was, in effect, Northern 
Rhodesia's army, not unlike the new Southern Rhodesian Army, whose 
primary loyalty and focus were local and not to distant bureaucrats in 
London. There does not, however, seem to be any indications that the 
the loyalty of the NRR Officers and NCOs was anywhere questioned by 
the British Government. 
Unlike Britain's other colonial forces, both police and military to 
the north of Rhodesia, the appointment, selection and retention of 
personnel in the BSAC's uniformed services seemed to have been on 
an ad hoc basis. We find, in 1894, that British and Indian Army officers 
who are lent to the Chartered Company " ... are allowed to volunteer for 
two years' service and at the end of this period, if their behavior has 
been thoroughly satisfactory, they receive an extra gratuity in addition 
to their pay. "14 
... [Military] personnel... were attached to the civil authorities. 
Later, many of these men were to transfer from the military to 
the police forces and still be under the authority of 
administrative, not police, officers. 15 
12 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Reeiment, p. vii. 
13 Clayton & Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Militaty and Police in British Colonial 
Africa, p. 146. 
14 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Re"iment p. 4. 
15 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Re"iment p. 5. 
33 
It is worth noting that settlers on the African frontier were not 
necessarily different from settlers on the American frontier, where 
loyalties quickly became parochial and norms of behavior were not all 
genteel. Those familiar with the reputation of the 'Wild West' should 
feel at home with the following description of Kenya in the first years 
after the Great War: 
Many of the new settlers were wild, on occasion not averse to a 
shoot-out with the police at closing time of the bars. Special 
precautions had to be taken in 1923 at the time of a wild project 
of a settler coup. 16 
The same applied to Northern Rhodesia, although, as previously 
mentioned, settler society British Africa was fairly law abiding. 11 The 
Northern Rhodesians presented a special security concern for the 
Colonial Office, although it is not possible to see the settlers as being 
in any way subversive, nor is there any evidence, other than a British 
desire to bring the NRR into the family of colonial forces, was there a 
yearning to cast off the mother country. There certainly seems to have 
been a strong Rhodesian identity and nationalism the strength of 
which, even in hindsight, is not easy to calculate as it involved a 
number of qualities. 18 However, a sense of British concern is evident in 
Major-General Giffard's report to the Colonial Office when he 
16 Clayton & Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial 
Africa, p. 110, and in Elspeth Huxley White Man's Country, pp. 135-139. 
17 "Northern Rhodesia lacked the aristocratic, pseudo-aristocratic, or Raffish 
element of Kenya. No 'remittance' men in Northern Rhodesia. Lusaka, Ndola, 
Livingstone never comparable to the Wild West or even the Kenya White Highlands." 
Letter from Dr. L.H. Gann, dated September 9th, 1994. 
18 See Anthony Di Perna, A ~ht to be Proud, and L.H. Gann From Ox Wagon to 
Armored Car in Rhodesia, Military Review. 
inspected the NRR in 1938. The policy of replacing the 0 non-
regular", i.e. Rhodesian, officers and NCOs with seconded British 
Officers and NCOs was taking place: 
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From the technical point of view, the Regiment has made a great 
advance, both in its training and in its administration during the 
preceding twelve months. I consider that the great credit for 
this achievement is due to Lieutenant-Colonel W.A. Dimoline, 
MC, and to the Officers and British Non-commissioned officers 
under his command. I desire to make special mention of the 
non-regular officers and British non-commissioned officers, who 
have loyally accepted the new policy of seconding officers and 
British non-commissioned officers from the Regular Army to the 
Regiment. The knowledge of local conditions and of the 
language possessed by these officers and British non-
commissioned officers and their service generally, have been of 
the utmost value. 19 
The question of possible divided or subversive loyalties of the 
local white population also figured in the establishment of the Kenya 
Regiment. 20 
The Kenya Regiment had been raised in 1936 with two aims. 
One was to channel the military aspirations of Kenya's young 
whites into a unit specifically controlled by the War Office, 
rather than the looser catch-all Kenya Defense Force 
organization existing as a result of local legislation and which it 
was feared might be used as an agent for local white political 
aspirations. The other was to act as an officer or white NCO-
producing unit for any expansion of the [King's African Rifles].21 
The selection of the name for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment 
is another area that seems to give an indication of how distinct the 
Rhodesians felt about their identity. One of the questions that was to 
19 Inspector-General's Reoort on the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, 1938. PRO CO 
820/34/13. 
20 See Elspeth Huxley's White Man's Country, Vol. 2, pp. 137-139, and Chapters 
XVI onwards for an idea of incipient white "nationalism" in Kenya. 
21 Clayton & Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial 
Africa, pp. 212-213. 
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arise during the time that the NRR became a fully integrated member 
of the African Colonial Forces was what name Northern Rhodesia's 
battalion was to have. One view is that, given the unique nature of the 
evolution of the battalion, from police to military unit, it was a natural 
follow on that the word 'Police' should be replaced by 'Regiment' for 
the military branch, but no one is entirely clear. 
The difference in name between the military forces of Northern 
Rhodesia those of the other East and Central African territories 
is probably due to the fact that right up until 1924 the territory 
was governed, not by the Colonial Office nor by the British 
Government, but by a Chartered Company ... 22 
The attitude among whites in Northern Rhodesia was as hostile 
to the concept of armed Africans as was the Southern Rhodesia 
Government and maintaining a separate title was, undoubtedly, an 
expression of a nascent Rhodesian nationalism: 
I do believe that the answer, as I see it, to the question is that up 
to the start of the 1939 war, Northern Rhodesia - like all the 
East African territories - was financially responsible for its own 
defense. Each territory was, really, self-contained and the cost 
to each for defense was just as much, or as little, as each 
country's Legislative Council liked to vote every year. There was 
no East African Command, no joint defense with each country 
paying a fixed annual contribution to a common pool. Therefore, 
I believe that the Northern Rhodesia view was that 'as we have 
to pay for a Regiment it's going to belong to us and be called by 
the name of the country that owns it and none of your East 
African King's African Rifles'. 23 
In 1938 the Regiment was reorganized by Major-General 
Giffard, the Inspector-General of the African Colonial Forces, under 
whose authority the NRR eventually came, on lines similar to the 
22 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, p. 65. 
23 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, p. 71. 
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askarl battalions in east and west Africa with its cadre coming from 
British regiments on fixed short term tours. This process extended 
over two or three years with most of the displaced personnel being 
absorbed into the administration of Northern Rhodesia or other 
African territories. 24 Why the NRR should have maintained its unique 
position in the family of colonial units for so long is probably best 
explained by a traditional reluctance by successive British 
Governments to interfere in domestic colonial affairs, deference to 
Rhodesian sensibilities and possibly even a lack of money. 
While Northern Rhodesia belonged to the South African settler 
tradition, inasmuch as most of its whites came from the south, its 
main attraction for settlers were the mines in the area known as the 
Copperbelt which bordered the Belgian Congo. The majority of Whites 
who moved there after the discovery of copper ... 
... were composed of all sorts and conditions of men - Texan 
drillers, hardbitten Afrikaners, Yugoslav timbermen, fitters and 
turners from South Africa, smeltermen from Wales, American 
construction experts with experience in the copper mines of 
Arizona or Latin America, Cornishmen and others.25 
They were far removed from the upper-class image of Kenya's 
settlers, or the more diverse and solid middle class of the Southern 
Rhodesians. As an illustration of this, in 1931, some six years after the 
Colonial Office assumed responsibility for the territory, the Governor 
of Northern Rhodesia, Sir James Maxwell, chaired a commission that 
made a report to the Oversea Defense Committee on security 
24 James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldierin" in the 20th Centmy, pp. 
300-301. 
25 L.H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 209. 
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problems in the Protectorate. 26 The transient nature of its small 
industrial age population, dependent as they were on the world price 
of copper and whose racial attitudes were less than enlightened, did 
not make for an easily soluble security situation. The report, written 
during the Depression, went into considerable detail about the 
problems associated with Northern Rhodesia's small white population 
and their unwillingness to have either an African infantry battalion or 
dedicate the necessary valuable time and money in order to form an 
all-white reserve unit in a country where whites were thin on the 
ground.21 The Governor's report contains analysis that not only reflects 
opinions of the day, but points to some simple truths and 
administrative problems: 
We are not prepared to disagree wholly with the view expressed 
by some of the witnesses that it is bad for the morale of a rapidly 
developing British colony that it should be entirely dependent 
for defense on African troops. We agree that when the European 
population has become stable, if it ever does, consideration 
should be given to the creation of a European defense force 
within the limits imposed by the financial circumstances of the 
territory. In the meantime we see nothing shameful in retaining 
as a form of insurance against possible trouble a small, highly 
efficient force, led by British Officers and Non-Commissioned 
Officers. 28 
The problems associated with establishing, what was then 
termed, a "European Defense Force" in the territory also spilled over 
into the realm of Imperial Defense planning. In the eyes of the 
Governor, the territory had an internal security problem that was 
26 CID-ODC, 638-M,1931. PRO CAB 8/55. 
27 CID-ODC, 638-M, 1931. PRO CAB 8/55. 
28 CID-ODC, 638-M, 1931. PRO CAB 8/55. 
" ... without parallel in the other African dependencies."29 Tribal 
Africans presented an easily solved security problem which involved 
the simple movement of the forces of law and order to potential 
trouble spots. The quandary lay in the Copperbelt: 
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The mining area, however, provides a problem peculiar to itself, 
since disturbances may take place in which Europeans and 
Africans are involved simultaneously. There is a strong anti-
native feeling among a section of the European workers, and the 
outbreak of inter-racial riots (possibly started by an incident of 
such as a case of rape) is not impossible. 
The growth of the trade union movement among the 
European workers with the latent possibility of strikes might 
well be another source of disturbance. 
In either eventuality, the restoration of order would present a 
difficult problem. It would be impossible to employ either the 
native police or the Northern Rhodesia Regiment to suppress 
disturbances in which Europeans were actively engaged.30 
These ingredients, aided by the reality that the world was in the 
middle of the Great Depression made for poor race relations and an 
internal security headache for the authorities in Northern Rhodesia. 
Northern Rhodesians' settler attitudes towards the NRR is expressed, 
very diplomatically, in the unit's official history: 
... there was a good deal of opposition from certain elected 
members of the Legislative Council to the strengthening of the 
Regiment. The opposition was based on the feeling in certain 
quarters that it was wrong for Europeans and European industry 
to be dependent for protection upon an African regiment. It was 
more strongly voiced in Legislative Council during the debate in 
1938 on the formation of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment's 
European Officer's and Non-commissioned Officer's Reserve, a 
vital step in the growth of the Regiment, that eventually passed 
and confounded the objectors by proving its necessity and value 
in 1939.31 
29 CID-ODC, 638-M, 1931. PRO CAB 8/55. 
3° CID-ODC, 638-M, 1931. PRO CAB 8/55. 
31 W.V. Brelsford, The Stoiy of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, pp. 73-74. 
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The NRR and its development from police force to infantry 
regiment illustrates the conflict between imperial necessity, military 
common sense and settlers' fears. In Southern Rhodesia, the larger 
white population, and the fact that political power was concentrated 
in Salisbury and not London, meant that a decision about raising such a 
unit could be shelved for as long as the old fears persisted. However, 
when Southern Rhodesia first raised an African battalion, the Rhodesia 
Native Regiment (RNR) in 1916, it was an unqualified success. 
CHAPTER V 
THE SOUTHERN RHODESIAN ARMY, 1926-1945 
Between 1926 and 1939 Southern Rhodesia's Army developed 
from little more than a territorial militia of two under-strength 
infantry battalions, whose value as a national defense asset was viewed 
as secondary to the older and proven BSAP, into an integral part of 
British imperial strategy. In order to better understand the process 
that the Southern Rhodesian Army went through, it will also be 
necessary to examine the military developments in Britain's colonies 
in east and west Africa and how Southern Rhodesia complemented 
Imperial defense strategy in a modest but significant way. 
The Defense Act of 1926 
Until 1926 the British South Africa Police was both army and 
primary law enforcement agency in Southern Rhodesia. The Southern 
Rhodesian Government was not satisfied with the system as it existed 
and, three years after the granting of self-government by the British in 
1923, took stock of its defense policies by enacting a comprehensive 
Defense Act that put Southern Rhodesia's defenses on a firm, but 
modest, statutory basis. The system that the new Government in 
Salisbury had inherited in 1923 was formed around the BSAP and a 
volunteer militia called the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers (SRV). Like 
the embryonic Rhodesian Army that was to follow, the SRV was based 
around a cadre of regulars, drawn mainly from the BSAP, who fulfilled 
the administrative function. The SRV harked back to an earlier era, 
with its definite Victorian frontier flavor, and was ... 
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. . . organized into the Cadre personnel and three columns of 500 
men each, and Rifle Companies. The Cadre personnel of a 
column consists of men trained in each arm of the service to 
which will be attached the fighting troops in time of emergency. 
The latter will be obtained from men who volunteer for service 
in time of emergency. 1 
The problem was that because of its voluntary nature, it was 
fundamentally unreliable, and probably of dubious quality, something 
that has always afflicted citizen militias.2 Given the history of Southern 
Rhodesia, and the frontier tradition of southern Africa, it was not 
something that the Government could ignore, and was reinforced by 
what appeared to be a somewhat jaded opinion of the young men of 
the day; "Efforts to get the youth of the Colony to realize their 
responsibilities in respect of military service have signally failed. "3 
Under the terms of the 1926 act, every male citizen between the ages 
of eighteen and sixty years was liable for military service in defense of 
the Colony in time of war. In peace time, every man between the age of 
twenty and twenty-four was liable to undergo military training with a 
stipulation that volunteers could join at eighteen. The thin spread of 
the white population was also taken into consideration and " ... only a 
prescribed number in prescribed areas shall be called up each year. 
1 Southern Rhodesia Defense Bill Memorandum. 1926. PRO WO 32I14151. 
2 "The collecting of the militia, depends entirely on the prospects of the day; if 
favorable, they throng to you; if not, they will not move." George Washington in History 
of the British Army, J.W. Fortesque, Vol. 3, p. 407. 
3 Southern Rhodesia Defense Bill Memorandum. 1926. PRO WO 32/14151. 
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These prescribed areas will probably be the larger townships. "4 At this 
time the annual training for those not called up, but liable for call-up. 
" ... and resident within a ten mile radius of a Defense Force Rifle Range 
shall undergo a course of musketry in each year ... " was seen as being 
sufficient to deal with any problems at the time. 
Southern Rhodesia also laid the foundations for a military system 
that went beyond the establishment of four reserve rifle companies. 
Even the school system was brought into the equation: 
Cadets have been included in this act. At the present time they 
are not provided for under any act and it is considered that they 
should now receive official recognition. The question of the age 
at which a Cadet should commence training has been the subject 
of correspondence and it is the opinion of the Director of 
Education that the present age of 12 should remain in force, as 
any alteration to a higher age would tend to the disbandment of 
smaller units such as Gatooma, Que Que, Enkeldoorn, etc. which 
was to be avoided. 
Service will include the whole period a cadet is at school, and 
will be compulsory unless the parent or guardian objects thereto 
in writing. 5 
The Cadet Corps was eventually disbanded in 1968. The details 
of the Bill that were outlined to the British by the Rhodesian Attorney 
General Sir Robert Mcilwaine in 1925 and next year by the new 
Minister of Defense (&Attorney General) Major R.J. Hudson in 1926 
was a highly comprehensive set of instructions for the Colony's 
security. Administratively, nothing was left to chance or ad hoc 
solutions, and between 1926 and the formation of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Act was amended four times. 
4 Southern Rhodesia Defense Bill Memorandum, Chapter 1, 1926. PRO WO 
32/14151. 
5 Southern Rhodesia Defense Bill Memorandum, Chapter 1, 1926. PRO WO 
32/14151. 
Despite a sometimes strained relationship between the BSAP 
and the Army in the years to come, the Act also provided for a 
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working relationship between the two services. The new order 
founded the BSAP's Reserve and Field Reserve, which cleared up 
concerns that a new military organization might compete for Southern 
Rhodesia's limited white manpower: 
One of the objections brought forward to the British South Africa 
Police forming the Permanent Force is that the members 
available to take the field are too [few]. The Field Reserve does 
away with this obligation. A further argument advanced is that it 
is dangerous to remove police from their districts in time of 
emergency. The British South Africa Police Reserve does away 
with this obligation. Both Field Reserve and British South Africa 
Police Reserve will consist of members of the British Sou th 
Africa Police. 6 
The paramilitary nature of the BSAP, its continuing dual role 
meant that in the years to come, a rivalry of sorts would grow up 
between the two services. In the 1930s this would become so 
pronounced that it became one of the reasons for the setting up of 
Southern Rhodesia's Council of Defense in 1936 when, for the first 
time, the small defense establishment, by now consisting of an 
embryonic air force and British South Africa Police, coordinated policy 
with the politicians. 1 
Nothing was to be left to chance. In his communication to the 
British, Hudson defined Southern Rhodesia as a British Dominion, a 
distinction that was to be ultimately compounded by the creation of 
what can best be described as a pseudo-Dominion, the Federation of 
6 Southern Rhodesia Defense Bill Memorandum, Chapter 2, 1926. PRO WO 
32/14151. 
7Letter from H.J. Stanley to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, No. 
339, Confidential, 10th July 1936. PRO CAB 21 /642. 
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Rhodesia and Nyasaland, " .. .I may point out that Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and the Union of South Africa, have all adopted the principle 
of compulsion." He was not blind to the demographic realities facing 
Southern Rhodesia, and undoubtedly the shadow of the struggles of 
the 1890s hung over his thoughts: 
... the need for compulsory training is, I think, more urgent than 
that of the first three named countries. We have in this Colony a 
comparative handful of Europeans living in the midst of a very 
large native population. Under present conditions the 
preponderance in numbers of natives over Europeans is 
increasing. If a serious native rising should occur - and that is 
the only eventuality against which we must prepare - every able 
bodied European in the districts affected, and probably in the 
whole Colony will be called upon for service at short notice. It is 
necessary, therefore, that steps be taken to train as large a 
proportion of the population as we can. I am convinced that no 
system of purely voluntary training will achieve this result, there 
will always be a large number of young men who for various 
reasons will not submit themselves to training, however willing 
they are to serve in time of War.8 
It would be inaccurate to assume that everyone in any position of 
authority in Africa blithely assumed that political change would never 
come to the British Empire. Hudson's statement, while reflecting a 
view of what the past was capable of, also had a sense of what the 
future might bring. This was the time when India was beginning its 
transition to independence and old certainties were beginning to be 
questioned. Five years after Southern Rhodesia's Defense Act, the 
Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir James Crawford Maxwell, in a 
report to the Committee for Imperial Defense-Oversea Defense 
Committee (CID-ODC) in London described the defense prospects 
8 Sub-enclosure II to Dispatch no. 281 from the Government of Southern 
Rhodesia dated 14 September 1925, Cost of Administrative Report Defense Paragraphs: 
314-319, 363- 380, memorandum by the Minister of Defense, Major R.J. Hudson, MP. 
PRO WO 32/14152. 
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Northern Rhodesia. It included these less than confident words about 
the future: 
Southern Rhodesia has made up its mind for better or for worse 
to create a European colonization within the Tropics. It is 
moving, with what eventual success it is difficult to foresee in 
view of differing opinions, towards the establishment of a stable 
polity. It anticipates its children and grandchildren and great-
grandchildren will make their homes in a colony which the 
present generation has founded and it is attempting to 
approximate as far as possible to the self-governing dominions 
lying within the temperate zone. 9 
Up until this point, the external defense of Southern Rhodesia, 
as shown by the record of the Boer War and the First World War, had 
been adequately met by a massive turnout of volunteers. While this may 
have been adequate and admirable in order to fight "England's 
enemies" beyond her borders, the Southern Rhodesia Government 
realized that, for a multitude of reasons, not least of which was the one 
described in the Memo to the British Government, the status quo 
would have to change. 
The men who went to the war were frequently a larger 
percentage of the white population than was the case with the other 
British Dominions. That this phenomenon was " ... probably attributable 
more to the nature of the Southern Rhodesian economy (i.e. 
predominately agricultural and extractive), from which it was easier to 
withdraw manpower, than, say, the industrial economy of Britain, 10 
9 CID-ODC, 638-M, Report of Defense Commission for Northern Rhodesia, under 
the chairmanship of Northern Rhodesian Governor, Sir James Crawford Maxwell, 
1931, Item 33. PRO CAB 8/55. 
10 Britain's armed forces absorbed 11 % of the population, Canada's 9.6 %, 
Australia's 13.6 %, the Gold Coast's 1.8 %. Peter McLaughlin, The Thin White Line: 
Rhodesia's Armed Forces since the Second World War, Zambezia(1978), Vol. VI (ii), p. 
176. 
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than to overwhelming patrtotism."11 is probably not a fair assessment 
of individual Rhodesian motivations but it does point out that the 
Rhodesian economy, emerging from the Depression and with a 
potential abundance of African labor, would not miss them. 
One thing is certain and that was that the long peace that 
ensued can only have tempered Rhodesian fears about having armed 
Africans in the Defense Force. However, the establishment of the 
Rhodesian African Rifles was, at this point the farthest from anyone's 
mind and will be dealt with later. 
The effectiveness of the BSAP in keeping Southern Rhodesia 
quiet also meant that the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers, like all 
volunteer citizen militias, was of inconsistent value, and they were so 
viewed in Southern Rhodesia. Major Hudson not only realized that the 
nature of the SRV was inadequate to the task of defending against a 
native uprising, but noted that the attitude of the citizenry towards 
volunteering was less than enthusiastic: 
A further objection to the voluntary system is that it is not a fair 
one - the drudgery and burden falls on the keen and 
conscientious men and those whose sense of duty is not so 
strong, escape. 12 
As it turned out, the peaceful nature of Southern Rhodesia in the 
1920s precluded the Government from turning it into a Sparta on the 
veld despite ongoing government concerns: 
... it is proposed to enforce full training in the three towns of 
11 Peter McLaughlin, The Thin White Line: Rhodesia's Armed Forces since the 
Second World War. Zambezia, Vol. VI (ii), p. 1 76. 
12 Sub-enclosure II to Dispatch no. 281 from the Government of Southern 
Rhodesia dated 14 September 1925, Cost of Administrative Report Defense Paragraphs: 
314-319, 363- 380, memorandum by the Minister of Defense, Major R.J. Hudson, MP. 
PROW032/14152. 
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Bulawayo, Salisbury and Umtali only. So far as the rest of the 
Colony is concerned, it is proposed to make it compulsory for all 
men of the prescribed age who reside within ten miles of a rifle 
company to join that company and complete the prescribed 
course of musketry each year. I do not think this would be too 
onerous an obligation and there should be little, if any, objection 
to it. 13 
The Rhodesia Regiment (RR) was thus established as a 
Territorial force, or a permanent reserve unit, despite some 
reservations about the worth of of the young generation, and its 
presumably inadequate sense of duty. 14 Four rifle companies were set 
up within a framework of two battalions, and were spread across the 
country. The first battalion was established in Salisbury at company 
strength and the second battalion, also at company strength, was 
formed in Bulawayo. The second, or 'B' Company, of both battalions 
were formed in Umtali and Gwelo respectively by the next year. 15 
The Southern Rhodesia Staff Corps 
The Staff Corps was established in 1926 as the Permanent Staff 
Corps and was the only group of Regulars, or Permanent Force 
13 Sub-enclosure II to Dispatch no. 281 from the Government of Southern 
Rhodesia dated 14 September 1925, Cost of Administrative Report Defense Paragraphs: 
314-319, 363- 380, memorandum by the Minister of Defense, Major R.J. Hudson, MP. 
PRO WO 32/14152. 
14 "In addition to its necessity for the military requirements of the Colony, 
compulsory training will, as pointed out by Mr. Moffat, be advantageous to the young 
manhood of the country. I have spoken to many persons on this point, there seems a 
general consensus of opinion that a large proportion our young men are lacking in 
discipline and sense of duty. Military training will, undoubtedly, tend to remedy these 
defects. Personally I do not think we should estimate its value in this respect too highly 
but in the opinion of many who are more competent than I am to judge, compulsory 
training will have a very great effect in improving the young men of the Colony." Sub-
enclosure II to Dispatch no. 281 from the Government of Southern Rhodesia dated 14 
September 1925, Cost of Administrative Report Defense Paragraphs: 314-319, 363- 380, 
memorandum by the Minister of Defense, Major R.J. Hudson, MP. PROW032/14152. 
15 A Brief Histoiy of the Rhodesia Army, p. 8. 
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members, in the Southern Rhodesian Army. The Permanent Force 
consisted of men drawn mostly from the BSAP, with a headquarters 
instructional and administrative staff consisting of six officers and 
twenty-one warrant officers and non-commissioned officers. This 
headquarters unit was the beginning of the permanent Staff Corps and 
was entirely administrative. 16 The chief problem with this 
organization, which would only become evident once the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established, was that it was not the 'brain' 
of the armed forces. It was not a body with an intellectual tradition 
that could objectively identify strategic problems facing Southern 
Rhodesia, or the Federation, and offer objective strategic military 
solutions that the politicians could use. The army of a minor self-
governing colony with less than thirty regular soldiers and four 
companies of citizen soldiers, whose priorities in life were far 
removed from the ones envisaged by the Minister of Defense would 
have to have had very perceptive leadership to predict what the future 
would bring. Intellectually and emotionally the new Rhodesian Army 
was probably more of a reserve unit for the British Army than an army 
in its own right. 
This was partly due to the nature of Southern Rhodesia which 
had no intellectual tradition; it had no university until after the 
Second World War. By way of contrast, South Africa has had universities 
since the early nineteenth century and a strong and influential 
intellectual tradition. 
The result was that the Staff Corps was little more than a 
16 A Brief History of the Rhodesia Army, p. 7. 
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training cadre for basic infantry tactics. Doctrine was based on the 
wars of the 1890s with modern technology and organization taking 
the place of the inspired armed settler. The new regular soldiers, 
most of whom had military experience, were drawn from the BSAP 
and formed the instructional and administrative nucleus of the Army 
until the expansion of the Second World War and the advent of the 
Federation after it. Other than identifying the problem, that is, the 
need to counter native uprisings, no preparation was made to equip 
the new Army with an organizational or intellectual framework that 
could identify and examine wider strategic problems. The Staff Corps 
never fulfilled that role, and nowhere is there evidence that it did. 
The result was two-fold. The presence of instructors, NCOs whose 
quality seems to have reflected comparable standards in the British 
Army " ... were quite capable of commanding rifle companies and were 
doing so within three or four years of the new army's formation and 
battalions and brigades within eight to ten years. "11 This made sense 
as the the Rhodesia Regiment was little more than four regionally 
based infantry companies, and the structure of the BSAP was based on 
small units of men operating alone in the tribal areas. "But of most of 
the officers there is something different to say." 
The intellectual quality of the more senior officers of the 
Rhodesian armed forces prior to and during Federation was low, 
their military interests parochial and combat experience at unit 
level very limited. The handling of formations on operations was 
an unknown science. Early on the staff system, such as it was, 
chiefly served a static geographic spread by an admixture of 
BSAP and civil service procedures. Occasionally small scale field 
deployments arose during Camps of Training for members of the 
RRR [Royal Rhodesia Regiment] fulfilling their annual 
obligations. Potentially enlivening links with other armies and 
17 Letter from Colonel Welch dated August 28, 1993. 
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overseas courses were severely restricted probably on financial 
grounds but also, I suspect, on account of inertia and an almost 
total absence of professional interest. Not for no reason was the 
Permanent Staff Corps as it was sometimes called nicknamed 
[sic] the Permanent Sports Club! Its members were indeed 
distinguished in that field if no other. 18 
The faults in the system were thus laid down early, and while 
the experiences gained by Rhodesians during the Second World War, 
and the influx of immigrants after it, greatly benefited the Federal 
Army and presumably the army of the breakaway Rhodesian republic. 
"The main point here is that the driving force for modernization and 
awareness of the needs of the future came from the bottom and not 
from the top." 19 It was the kind of flaw that an army of such a country 
could not afford to have. 
The Southern Rhodesia Council of Defense. 1936 
From the establishment of the Defense Force in 1927 until 
1936, the BSAP and the Army had two separate commanders. 
However, when the Commanding Officer of the Army retired, the 
BSAP Commander was appointed as Acting Officer Commanding 
Southern Rhodesia Forces and all units of the Defense Forces were 
brought under one command. "It is thought that·the present system 
should lead to smoother working and should bring the various units, 
Permanent and Non-permanent closer together." 
In addition to securing a greater measure of cooperation 
between the units of the Force the following advantages have 
been achieved:-
(a) The Minister is brought into closer and more satisfactory 
18 Letter from Colonel Welch dated August 28, 1993. " .. .it was not unknown for 
quality junior NCOs (who had held commissions in the British Army) to be instructors 
on officers' tactics courses." 
19 Letter from Colonel Welch dated August 28, 1993. 
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contact with the whole Force. 
(b) The OC [Officer Commanding] has a better peacetime 
knowledge of the Forces he will command in war time and 
accordingly, can secure a greater measure of coordination in the 
training of all units. 
(c) Some measure of economy has been obtained by the 
elimination of one senior officer from the military command. 
( d) Policy under one commander is facilitated and the 
requirements of all units can be presented to the Government 
through one channel, thus eliminating the competitive element 
in securing funds. 20 
In May 1936, Southern Rhodesia established a Council of 
Defense composed of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and 
the heads of the different military organizations and the British South 
Africa Police " ... to consider the Defense problems of the Colony and 
advise the Government on such matters as may be placed before it." In 
short, the council was to have functioned as Southern Rhodesia's 
political and military brains for the formulation of military policy, and 
the closest thing to a General Staff that the Defense Forces were to 
have. It was not a system that was continued and by the time of 
Federation had been abandoned. 
Their aims were to secure greater cooperation between the 
various units, bring the Prime Minister and Defense Minister into 
contact with them, coordinate policy, and eliminate " ... the 
competitive element in securing funds." With the retirement of the 
Army Commander, the Police Commander was made Acting Officer 
Commanding of the Army. This 'measure of economy' brought the 
Army and Police under one Commander for perhaps the only time in 
its history. The first meeting also established the Southern Rhodesian 
Air Unit on a formal, but humble basis. 
20 Letter from H.J. Stanley to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, No. 
339, Confidential, 10th July 1936. PRO CAB 21 /642. 
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The document went on to spell out in some detail what the 
military establishment of Southern Rhodesia looked like and the 
coordination that was taking place with the Imperial Defense 
Committee in London. This was the run up to General Giffard's arrival 
on the scene and his proposals to the Rhodesians which turned 
Southern Rhodesia's defense establishment into an adjunct of Britain's 
armed forces. Because of these arrangements with Britain, the 
statement in the Defense Council document that "The OC [Officer 
Commanding] has a better peacetime knowledge of the Forces he will 
command in war time ... " was to never take place during the Second 
World War, or any other conflict until after UDI. 
CHAPTER VI 
STANDING GUARD; 
African soldiers, the British Empire, and Southern Rhodesia 
One of the most important military developments for Southern 
Rhodesia was the military relationship with Britain's African Colonial 
Forces in the years leading up to the Second World War. The African 
Colonial Forces encompassed all of the armed forces north of the 
Zambezi River, to include the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, and south 
of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The benefits that were to come from this 
alliance between the small Rhodesian community and the military 
forces of ten African colonies and possessions were far reaching. 
In the waning years of the nineteenth century, both Britain and 
the British South Africa Company had installed themselves in east and 
south-central Africa within a few years of each other. Their first 
actions were to set up authorities that would enforce laws and 
maintain peace in the new territories. Whether it was the 
establishment of a new settler community in the heart of Africa, or the 
suppression of the slave trade, the immediate need was to raise an 
armed force of some description that would not be a financial burden 
to the British taxpayer. 
The Royal West African Frontier Force and the King's African Rifles 
The British colonies and protectorates in West Africa were the 
the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria. Unlike east 
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Africa, where British colonization began late in the nineteenth 
century, British association and possession, in some cases, dated back 
to the sixteenth century, if only as trading stations, and their military 
organizations laid claim to a longer association with the British. One 
example given shows the metamorphosis from hired watchmen, of 
possible dubious value, to famous regiments: 
... the Oil River Irregulars and possibly better known by its 
nickname, 'the Forty Thieves'; in 1891 its title was changed to 
the Niger Coast Constabulary, and in 1900 to the Southern 
Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force. 1 
The transition from paramilitary watchmen to bona fide military 
units took longer than in east Africa. The West African Frontier Force 
(WAFF) was established in 1897 and brought the various forces in west 
Africa under a unified command with its own Inspector-General. 
British officers and NCOs were sent from British regiments on a 
voluntary basis to the WAFF for tours of duty of a fixed length.2 
In the east African territories the rule of the Imperial British 
East Africa Company, another chartered company, was so short and 
unsuccessful as to be insignificant in their development as British 
possessions. In British East Africa, which became Kenya and Uganda 
after the First World War, and Nyasaland, various military units were 
either raised locally or recruited in other British territories. In 
January 1902, following the example of the WAFF, Nyasaland's Central 
African Rifles, the East African Rifles, in what became Kenya, and the 
Uganda Rifles were brought together as battalions of the King's African 
1 James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldierin~ in the 20th Century, pp. 174-
175. 
2 James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldierin~ in the 20th Century, p. 175. 
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Rifles (KAR). 3 Like the WAFF, the KAR had its own Inspector-General, 
and its various battalions came under a unified command with British 
officers and NCOs being seconded on a voluntary basis. 4 As with so 
many military forces in colonies around the world, the line between 
police and military duties during those early days were blurred.5 
British Somaliland caine under British control in 1885 because 
of its strategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea. It first came 
under the Foreign Department of the Government of India, as did 
those British protected-territories on the Persian Gulf and on the 
periphery of south Arabia. 6 In 1898 The Foreign Office took over from 
the Indian Government, and in 1905 the Colonial Office was given the 
final responsibility for the territory. 7 
The Somaliland Cainel Corps (SCC) was raised in 1914 to fight 
against Mohammed bin Abdulla Hassan, known to the British as the 
"Mad Mullah." After a twenty year campaign (1900-20) of considerable 
3 1st and 2nd Battalions were from Nyasaland, 3rd Battalion was from Kenya, 
4th and 5th from Uganda, and 6th was raised for service in Somaliland. The number of 
battalions rose and fell depending on the economic and political situation. When the 
KAR was disbanded at the end of British rule there were seven battalions. Clayton & 
Killingray, Khaki and Blue, pp. 200-201. 
4 The Inspector-General " ... was charged with advising the government 
departments concerned, ... the Colonial Office and the War Office ... " and three, later four, 
colonial administrations in East Africa. "He was also responsible for inspecting the 
various units and had authority to issue directions. In the event of operations, 
whenever two or more KAR battalions were involved he would exercise overall 
command. It was not an easy assignment" James Lunt, Imoerial Sunset, p. 206. 
5 Clayton & Killingray, Khaki and Blue, pp. 79, 109-110. 
6 Aden, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrein, Oman and the Trucial States (today's United 
Arab Emirates). Aden was under the only British possession, the rest were protected 
states. Ravindar Kumar, India and the Persian GulfRe~ion, pp. 1-20. 
7 The Foreign Office was responsible for all Protectorates, the Colonial Office for 
the Dominions and Colonies. Starting in 1880, Protectorates began to be transferred to 
the Colonial Office. The Cambrid~e History of the British Empire, Vol. III, p. 742. 
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ferocity in which the Mullah's forces showed great military skill, the 
British were victorious only because the Mullah died of sickness in 
1920.8 The SCC came under the organizational umbrella of the KAR in 
1923, and, in 1940 at the outbreak of the war with Italy, consisted of 
fourteen British officers, 400 askaris9 , and 150 reservists in two Camel 
Companies, two Pony Troops and a rifle company from 1 KAR. 10 
Nyasaland had supplied an extra company since 1922 when a company 
of the sec had refused to put down a disturbance which resulted in 
the death of a British officer. 11 Being a part of the KAR was not a 
popular idea with the Somali askari, who are a cultural part of the 
Moslem Arab world. 12 
Like the KAR battalions and companies in east Africa, the Royal 
West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), as it became in 1928, could be 
moved between the various possessions, when needed, to support one 
8 Captain Adrian de Wiart, later to win a VC and become a Lieutenant-General, 
wrote, "In spite of many expeditions against him had evaded capture, and when he was 
finally defeated by airplanes I felt a sense of real personal loss. He was a Godsend to 
officers with an urge to fight and a shaky or non-existent bank balance." James Lunt, 
Imperial Sunset, p. 250. 
9 Askari comes from the Arabic word for army, 'askar. In the context of Africa, 
it refers to African soldiers who are led by European officers and NCOs. 
10 James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldierin~ in the 20th Centurv, p. 258. 
N.B. '1 KAR' is the shorthand description of the First Battalion, the King's African 
Rifles. This method is used in the British Army and will be used throughout this study. 
11 James Lunt, Imoerial Sunset: Frontier Soldierin~ in the 20th Century, p. 253. 
12 
" ••• there were also disciplinacy troubles when the [71st KAR) battalion was 
raised, the Somali soldiers demanding Indian style uniforms rather than KAR, and in 
the event receiving most of it; their objections included that of being treated as 
'Christians and East Africans.'" Clayton & Killingray, Khaki and Blue, pp. 268-269. 
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another. 13 The African Colonial Forces were not organized like the 
Indian Army, which was a separate organization from the British Army, 
and where the British officers would spend their entire career. Senior 
British NCOs and officers were supplied by secondment, usually for a 
renewable two and a half year tour after a long home leave. 14 The 
Sudan Defense Force had its origins in Britain's relationship with 
Egypt and will not be dealt with. 15 
When the question of raising units like the KAR arose in the 
Rhodesias, the answer from the settlers was always an emphatic no. As 
we have seen, the prime concern of the 1926 Defense Act was the 
possibility of a native uprising; "Outnumbered thirty-six to one, was it 
sensible to arm and (even more importantly) train a unit that could 
provide a hard core of disciplined leadership for insurrection?"15 
However, what we find in Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia 
is a clash between two British colonial traditions which, over time, 
gave rise to the hybrid that became the Rhodesian Army. 
The frontier military tradition was essentially the militia system, the 
13 Unlike the KAR , the RWAFF contained battalions that took the name of the 
territories they were based in, i.e. the Nigeria Regiment, the Gold Coast Regiment, etc. 
James Lunt, Imperial Sunset, p. 175. 
14 James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldierin~ in the 20th Century, pp. 
218-219. 
15 The Sudan Defense Force was founded in 1925 after a mutiny of Egyptian and 
Sudanese soldiers, which arose from a dispute between Britain and Egypt over the 
Sudan. The SDF was controlled by the Governor-General of the Sudan, who in tum 
came under the Foreign Office, and not the Colonial Office, a simpler structure than the 
African Colonial Forces. Unlike the African Colonial Forces, where all officers were 
British, the SDF had Sudanese officers, which meant that the British officers were 
older and more senior than KAR and RWAFF officers and tours were longer. Because of 
the Egyptian and Ottoman connection, all rank titles were in Turkish. James Lunt, 
Imperial Sunset, pp. 277-279. 
16 Owen, The Rhodesian African Rifles, p. 1. 
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citizen in arms which goes back to the Middle Ages. English colonial 
governments had always found it cheaper, and possibly more 
convenient politically, to have a citizen militia composed of settlers 
ready to be called upon in an emergency, than a body of professional 
soldiers, loyal to the mother country, costing money and, to 
complicate things, misbehaving in their free time. The militia 
tradition held sway in Southern Rhodesia until the reality of its small 
white population, the harshness of the climate, especially to the north 
of the Zambezi River, and the fact that Africans were more than willing 
to volunteer, forced them to change and incorporate elements of 
England's other colonial military tradition. 
This other tradition had its origins in the practical need to 
protect British economic and strategic interests in areas which were 
not particularly healthy for Europeans, such as east and west Africa, 
home to the KAR and RWAFF, the Caribbean and India. The highest 
expression of this process was the British Indian Army, whose origins 
were as the army of the East India Company, a completely separate 
organization from the British Army, in which British officers served 
for their entire professional careers. In Africa, as we shall see, the 
union of these two English traditions, the settler militia and the native 
soldiers led by white officers came together, clashed and resolved 
themselves in Northern and Southern Rhodesia. 
Failure of the All-White Army and the Rhodesia Native Regiment. 
1914-1918 
Factors that led to the establishment of Southern Rhodesia's 
first black unit, were the necessity of war, the African climate and, the 
willingness of the Africans living in the Reserves to join up and fight 
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the Germans. Until the First World War, the Southern Rhodesians 
followed the pattern of the other, all-white British Dominions and 
raised units composed exclusively of whites to fight the King's 
enemies. "There was traditional White suspicion of Black troops and 
the creation of more Black units [was seen] as a potential Pandora's 
Box, even though these troops have been consistently loyal throughout 
the country's history." 11 
The raising of the RNR and the debate that was to ensue about 
the merits of training Africans, was linked to the fate of the Rhodesian 
volunteers who answered the call to arms in 1914. The high casualty 
rate of the First World War affected the small white population of 
Rhodesia as much as it did anyone else. The difference was that the 
the white population base was considerably smaller than any of the 
other territories that aspired to or had achieved nationhood. Not only 
were Rhodesians serving in Europe, but one of the two all-white, 
battalion-size infantry units, the 2nd Rhodesia Regiment, was almost 
decimated by the campaign in German East Africa. 
The ranks of the all-white (South African, Rhodesian & British) 
and Indian Army units in east Africa were ravaged not so much by the 
German commander, General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (whose use and 
leadership of his Schutztruppe showed that African soldiers could be 
loyal and effective) but by the unhealthy climate of Tanganyika, as 
German East Africa became after the First World War. 18 The 2nd 
17 Peter McLaughlin, The Thin White Line: Rhodesia's Armed Forces since the 
Second World War. Zambezia(l978), Vol. VI (ii), p. 178. 
18 "As a result 12,000 South Africans were sent home. Replacements had to be 
found from somewhere." Major J.R. Sibley, Tan~anyikan Guerrilla. East African 
Campajin 1914-1918, p. 115. 
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Rhodesia Regiment had to be dis banded in early 191 7 because of 
disease: "Fewer than seventy men could answer roll call among the 
2nd Rhodesians, although more than one thousand troops had passed 
through their ranks in various drafts. "19 
The medical statistics of 2nd Rhodesia Regiment speak for 
themselves. There were 2,272 admissions to hospitals and 
10,626 cases of sickness. The regiment had 1,038 men pass its 
ranks during its East African campaign war. This meant that on 
average every man went to hospital twice and reported sick ten 
times. Periodically the regiment, with a nominal strength of 
800, was reduced to an effective combat strength of less than 
100; when it was pulled out of East Africa in January 1917 there 
were only 91 men fit for duty. The Germans had not killed the 
2nd Rhodesia Regiment, disease had.20 
White Rhodesians had originally hoped to form a Regiment that 
would be deployed to the Western Front as a single national unit, as 
the other dominions were doing. The closest they came to realizing 
this was their 'adoption· of the King's Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC), a 
British light infantry regiment. 21 The reasons for Rhodesians going 
into the KRRC are not clear, but it may have had to do with its 
reputation as an elite unit, its frontier origins or the fact that the 
KRRC had no overt county associations as was, and frequently still is, 
the case with most British regiments. While Rhodesians served in 
19 "Really," wrote Smuts to a colleague, "this is not a country into which to bring 
a force of white men." Charles Miller, Battle for the Bundu, The First World War in East 
Africa, pp. 232-233. 
20 Peter McLaughlin, Ra~ime Soldiers. The Rhodesian Experience in the First 
\\brld War, p. 41. 
21 The 60th, or Royal American Regiment, was raised to fight the French in 
North America during the Seven Year's War but never served in America during the War 
of Independence. It became the King's Royal R!fle Corps (with two battalions) in 1881. It 
survives today as the Royal Green Jackets, after it merged with two other light infantry 
regiments in 195 7. 
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almost every unit and branch of service in the British forces, the KRRC 
seemed to offer them a home, so much so that all-Rhodesian platoons 
were formed. 22 
As infantry on the Western Front, Rhodesians discovered that 
war in the twentieth century was not something that the Colony's 
small white population could sustain: 
Once the unit was thrown into Flanders it rapidly began to suffer 
casualties; at times the toll of dead and wounded was so great 
that the Rhodesian platoon virtually ceased to exist. But it was 
always resurrected by fresh recruits from Rhodesia .... But 
throughout the war replacements posed a problem. The platoons 
would be suddenly exposed to sharp, murderous bouts of action 
which all at once decimated them, and the steady but small flow 
of recruits often took months to reconstitute them. The 2nd 
Rhodesia Regiment died a long, lingering death, but the 
Rhodesian platoons in Europe died many times over, rising 
Phoenix-like each time. 23 
Rhodesians who had been in the 2nd Rhodesia Regiment, and 
then went to serve with the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade on the 
Western Front found that " ... the war was more deadly and relentless, 
and the troops found that they had left one hell-hole for another. 24 The 
Rhodesians came back home with new perceptions: 
Of the 5,716 [white Rhodesians] who served during the Great 
War over 700 were killed, or died of wounds, disease and other 
causes. This was over twelve percent of the total in dead alone.25 
The casualty rates alone demonstrated that Southern Rhodesia 
could not sustain large all-white national units. However as Southern 
22 Peter McLaughlin, Ra~ime Soldiers, pp. 49-50. 
23 Peter McLaughlin, Ra~time Soldiers, pp. 50-51. 
24 Peter McLaughlin, Ra~time Soldiers, pp. 51-52. 
25 Peter McLaughlin, Ra~ime Soldiers, p. 140. 
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Rhodesia had experienced trouble in its efforts to convince Africans to 
join the Rhodesian economy, the feeling was that they should not be 
urged to join up. There was competition for African labor, especially in 
the mines and on the farms and, not unnaturally, the BSAC and the 
rising manpower needs of the war clashed: 
The Administrator, Sir Drummond Chaplin, wrote of Southern 
Rhodesia's manpower problem in 1917: 'I am afraid we have 
about come to the end of the men whom we can send to the war 
from this Territory. We shall be able to raise another native 
contingent, and we may get a platoon or two for the 2nd 
Rhodesia Regiment, but that is about all. We must keep the 
mines going and retain adequate protection or something like it, 
to deal with any possible local trouble.'26 
Africans were originally recruited in 1915 as drivers for the 
Army or as 'scouts' for the 2nd Rhodesia Regiment. In 1916 a decision 
was finally made to raise an African regiment since, besides the 
already mentioned drain on the colony's white manpower, the BSAC 
was ready to knock over the sacred cow of all-white fighting units: 
In addition, the Administration decided to abandon the 
'unwritten code' in the face of German 'treachery' in using 
African troops. As the Rhodesia Herald put it in a report 
sounding remarkably like an advertisement for a lonely hearts 
club: "Natives accustomed to life in the bush were wanted to 
meet similarly skilled natives acting in concert with the 
Germans, and in response to a demand for such men the native 
of Rhodesia flocked willingly to the colors anxious to show their 
loyalty to the King. "27 
The Rhodesia Native Regiment began life as an Ndebele unit 
because it was felt that their warlike reputation (they are an offshoot of 
the Zulu nation) would make them a natural choice as soldiers. 
26 Peter McLaughlin, Ra~ime Soldiers, pp. 73-74. 
27 Peter McLaughlin, Ragtime Soldiers, p. 7 4. 
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However, while recruiting was eventually extended to other African 
groups in Southern Rhodesia the main source of recruits came from 
outside of the Colony (the Shona hid from recruiters fearing that they 
would be conscripted). When the second battalion of the RNR was 
raised in 191 7 the recruiters concentrated on African migrants from 
north of the Zambezi, so that by 1918 seventy-five percent of the 
2,360 who had passed through its ranks came from beyond the 
borders of Southern Rhodesia. 28 The practice of drawing from as many 
of the ethnic or tribal groups as possible from which to fill the 
Colony's defense force meant that no one group would dominate or 
subvert the loyalties of its members, and the regiment became the 
askaris' primary focus of loyalty. This was a common British practice, 
with notable exceptions like the Gurkha regiments in India, 
throughout the empire. 
In Northern Rhodesia, the question of whether or not to 
maintain an African battalion came up against the territory's 
demographic and economic realities. The all-white Northern Rhodesia 
Rifles, originally the Northern Rhodesia Rifle Association, was raised 
in October 1914, issued with rifles, but no uniforms; " ... their only 
distinctive military insignia being a badge in the form of a 
hartebeeste's head with the letters "N.R.R."29 and marched from the 
rail line to the border with German East Africa, some 550 miles 
away.3() By October of 1915, the unit was disbanded and the men were 
28 Peter McLaughlin, Ra~ime Soldiers, pp. 7 4-75. 
29 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Re~iment, p. 35. 
30 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Re~iment, p. 29. 
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dispersed to other units in Africa or went to join the British Army in 
Europe. "As was to be expected of such a force, composed of tough, 
independent-minded settlers, relations between them and the more 
regular forces were sometimes not all they should be. "31 
They possibly were a tough, awkward lot to handle, but their 
qualities of individualism and leadership were obviously wasted 
so long as they were employed as a unit and would be better 
employed by individuals taking the lead in other units.32 
In any case, the men of the Northern Rhodesia Rifles returned 
from their short but not undistinguished war in rags and by 1925 the 
unit had ceased to exist even as a reserve unit. 33 The hope among 
settlers in Northern Rhodesia that their territory would follow 
Southern Rhodesia's constitutional path was stillborn and the fate of 
its short lived all-white unit was a faint echo of military developments 
south of the Zambezi. 
The Rhodesians and the South Africans had felt that the conflict 
in Africa should be a 'White Man's War'. This idea had first come about 
during the Boer War when neither side, except for an occasional lapse, 
had used African soldiers. Given the small size of German forces in 
east Africa, this unwritten 'code' was disregarded by them and it soon 
became obvious to everyone that Africans made excellent soldiers who 
could put up with the climate in German East Africa. The Germans 
added insult to injury by integrating settlers into the all-black, white-
led Schutztruppe in east Africa which did not happen in South West 
31 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhcxlesia Regiment. p. 35. 
32 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, pp. 35-36. 
33 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, p. 36. 
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Africa. The First World War in Africa became a war, with the previous 
exception, between black soldiers led by white officers. Not only was 
the WAFF brought in from west Africa, but the KAR was expanded and 
the NRP became, despite its name, a fully-fledged infantry battalion of 
askaris. Southern Rhodesia was also brought into the equation, much 
to her discomfort, by the creation of the RNR: 
General Northey [commander of the Northern Rhodesia Police] 
who was fighting the Germans along the Northern 
Rhodesia/Nyasaland border and whose fully stretched troops 
were being daily depleted by sickness got wind of the rumor and 
immediately let the War Office know that he could certainly do 
with extra African troops from Southern Rhodesia. 34 
The RNR served against the German Schutztruppe with great 
success and distinction, but it was rapidly disbanded, in December 
1918, at the end of hostilities. 
It is sad to record that though the King had seen fit to permit 
the use after the surname of the initials of distinction won, the 
[British South Africa Company] Administration, shamefully, 
issued a directive that the Askaris, having endured so much, 
were to be discouraged from doing so. 35 
The Rhodesian African Rifles. 1940-45 
The same manpower problems affected Southern Rhodesia at 
the outbreak of the Second World War; her white population was 
larger, but could in no way sustain all-white units as had been 
attempted in the First World War. The Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) 
came into existence as a permanent unit in Southern Rhodesia's 
Defense Force in 1940 amid controversy. Necessity, however, forced 
34 Col. Kim Rule, The Rhodesia Native Regiment: A Battle History 1916-1918, 
Lion & Tusk, Vol. 5, No. 1, Autumn 1993. 
35 Col. Kim Rule, The Rhodesia Native Regiment: A Battle History 1916-1918, 
Lion & Tusk, Vol. 5, No. 1, Autumn 1993. 
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the pace and dictated the composition of the Southern Rhodesian 
Army during the War. Up until that point any suggestion of emulating 
the Northern Rhodesian experience caused an outcry. 
The newspapers were filled with letters asserting that the 
inevitable result of arming and training a large body of Africans 
would be the extinction of the white man in Rhodesia. They 
reminded the nation (in lucid and horrifying detail) of the 
Matabele and Mashona rebellions which had ravaged the country 
a little more than forty years ago. 36 
Rhodesians from both sides of the Zambezi were reluctant to 
raise and arm Africans. The RAR never got larger than a battalion in 
strength during the Second World War, while the NRR rose to eight 
battalions. This may have been a question of expense as much as 
anything else, but it is also likely that it reflected Southern Rhodesian 
fears about armed Africans. 
The drain on white manpower meant that objections to raising 
the RAR were overruled as frivolous or against the war effort. The 
chief objection came from the farming community which was heavily 
dependent on African labor. However, since the amount of men 
needed to form two battalions would take less than two percent of the 
total available African manpower, the objections were dismissed. 37 
Even the objections of the South African Government which, 
beyond a few labor units, had an all-white army, were ignored by the 
Southern Rhodesians, and what appears to have been a new attitude 
among Rhodesians about armed Africans and the RAR developed: 
In fact within a few short months of its inception, an 
extraordinary surge of feeling for the new regiment began to 
grip the general public. White Rhodesians took the Battalion to 
36 Owen, The Rhodesian African Rifles, p. 2. 
37 Owen, The Rhodesian African Rifles, pp. 3-4. 
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their hearts, and any parade always attracted an enthusiastic 
audience. It was soon apparent that the regiment was regarded 
with widespread pride and affection. 38 
Why the turn around in public opinion should have taken place is 
not easy to explain. Rhodesians and South Africans, or more accurately 
Afrikaners, had always had a difficult relationship with one another 
and it may be that acceptance of the RAR by Rhodesians, with their 
strong pro-British loyalties, was another way of showing it. It is also 
possible that, after forty years of peace, Rhodesians believed that they 
had found the formula for peaceful coexistence with the black 
majority. An article in the Star, a Johannesburg newspaper, while 
giving an effusive description of Southern Rhodesia's enthusiastic war 
effort, in contrast to the divided opinion about the war in Sou th Africa, 
also heaps praise on the Colony's race relations: 
This desire to do their utmost to help the Empire and France 
crush the menace of Nazism is not confined to the European 
population. It is the desire, also, of the native population to play 
their part. The loyalty of the native people is unquestioned. The 
arrival of the British 50 years ago saved them from 
extermination by internal warfare, periodical famines and 
disease. During the last 40 years they have lived in peace, their 
numbers have doubled, they have grown rich in cattle, they live 
in security and contentment in their reserves, and know that 
there is always work for them on mines and farms and in the 
towns to enable them to earn money for their expanding needs. 
They have every reason to be satisfied with British rule, and they 
have no desire to change it. The natives will not be used in the 
fighting forces, but their services as laborers and camp servants 
will be valuable.39 
Obviously, the last sentence reflected thinking in the early days 
of the war but, given this rosy description, which Rhodesians were to 
38 Owen, The Rhodesian African Rifles, p. 4. 
39Article from The Star, 30 November 1939. PRO DO 119/ 1114 
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incorporate into the national ideal, the establishment of an African 
unit was the next logical step. The creed of partnership between the 
races, never a very-well defined ideal of Cecil Rhodes, found 
expression after the Second World War in the short-lived Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 
Race relations in the Federal Army were generally v. good 
indeed. In fact no one ever used the term or thought in 
"politically correct" terms as is fashionable today. I did not, nor 
did anyone else think about a native uprising. 40 
The RAR had 'arrived' and the change in attitudes in Southern 
Rhodesia was vividly illustrated in the 1950s with the Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland Army which had, for most of its existence, only four regular 
infantry battalions, all of whom were classical askarl units.41 
That, however, was for the future. The problem facing the new 
unit, and for the Government of Southern Rhodesia, was what to do 
with it. Whether or not this was because the RAR did not come under 
the authority of the African Colonial Forces, or because of the fears of 
having Africans askaris exposed to the corrupting influences of the 
outside world, or whatever, is not known. What is true is that the men 
who joined were generally eager to go to war so that by 1942 with the 
prospect of no action in sight, the situation was becoming critical: 
On several occasions the Battalion was ordered to prepare for a 
transfer, and embarkation leave was granted, but each time the 
40 Letter from Colonel Welch dated August 28, 1993. 
41 The Rhodesian African Rifles, the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, and 1st and 
2nd (Nyasaland) Battalions of the King's African Rifles. In 1961 two regular, all-white 
units were added to the Federal Army for the first time; 1st Battalion, the Rhodesian 
Light Infantry and 'C' Squadron, Rhodesian Special Air Service Regiment. RLI never 
rose above battalion strength and the SAS was a company-size special force unit. The 
Southern Rhodesia Artillery Regiment, which had existed since 1948, and the 
Rhodesian Armored Car Regiment, which was raised and disbanded four times after 
1941, were white reserve battalions. 
69 
men returned to camp they were told that the posting had been 
canceled. One officer became so frustrated by this continuous 
wavering that he retired to his bed and refused to leave it for 
several days. Other officers applied for postings to more active 
units, and others eased their irritations by turning mess nights 
into minor riots. As for the askari - they simply downed tools 
and "went home". Or else they indulged in petty crime. 42 
It was not until 1944, after tasks that included escorting POWs 
from Durban to Southern Rhodesia and endlessly repetitive training, 
that the RAR went to war in Burma as part of a backup unit for the 
11th (East African) Division. 43 
The RAR returned to Southern Rhodesia at the end of the war to 
praise and acceptance by Southern Rhodesia, in stark contrast to the 
RNR's fate in 1918.44 The Regiment was awarded the RNR's battle 
honors from the First World War and was not disbanded like its 
predecessor. Until the establishment of the regular white combat units 
in the early 1960s it was Southern Rhodesia's only regular combat 
unit. It took part in the Malayan Emergency and was expanded during 
the Chimurenga War, remaining faithful to the Rhodesian government 
42 Owen, The Rhodesian African Rifles, p. 14. 
43 "It was also the intention that there should be two brigades in reserve from 
which reinforcements could be drawn in bulk. One of these was the 28th (East African) 
Brigade ... The other, the 22nd (East African) Brigade, consisting of the 1st (Nyasaland) 
Battalion, King's African Rifles; the 5th (Kenya) Battalion, King's African Rifles; and 
the 3rd Northern Rhodesia Regiment, arrived in Ceylon from Mombasa in July, 1944. 
In August the 5th Battalion, King's African Rifles left the 22nd Brigade to join the 
11th Division. A month later its place in the Brigade was taken by the 1st Battalion, 
Rhodesian African Rifles, which had completed eight months training in East Africa." 
J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia, 1939-45, Vol. 2, p. 573. 
44 15,153 Africans joined the Southern Rhodesian Army of whom 1,503 served 
outside of the Colony. Africans who served in Southern Rhodesia served as guards for 
the various militaiy installations in units such as the Air Askari Corps. The ones who 
served overseas went to Burma. J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 
1939-45, Vol. 2, Appendix, p. i. 
70 
until 1980 when it became part of the Zimbabwe National Army. 45 
45 "During 1953 The Rhodesian African Rifles were presented with their Queen's 
and Regimental Colors by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother. Later the 
Battle Honors of'Arakan Beaches', 'Taungup' and 'Burma 1944-1945' were added to 
those ['East Africa 1916-1918'] received by the Rhodesia Native Regiment in World War 
I" A Brief History of the Rhodesia Army, pp. 13-14. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE ALLIANCE; Britain, Southern Rhodesia 
and the African Colonial Forces, 1935-1945 
The coming of the Second World War brought about a more 
radical change in the organization and mission of Southern Rhodesia's 
minuscule armed forces than anything that had gone before. From 
being a part of the BSAP's scheme for internal defense of the Colony, 
the army became an adjunct to Imperial defense and brought about 
radical change and expansion. The changes that affected the army 
came from a need by the British for officers and NCOs for their African 
colonial units. It altered the entire nature of the army and ultimately 
its future development. 
Until 1931 the military forces in Britain's sub-Saharan African 
colonies came under two officers; the Inspector-General of the KAR 
and the Inspector-General of the RWAFF. In September 1931, the two 
positions were combined into that of Inspector-General of the KAR 
and the RWAFF; in 1939 the title became the Inspector-General of 
African Colonial Forces. This semantic change also obviated the need 
to place the NRR, now well on the way to becoming integrated into 
the Colonial military system, under the organizational umbrella of 
either the KAR or the RWAFF. The new position also carried a higher 
rank and was now to be held by General officers and not Colonels as 
had been the case up to this point. 1 
The Inspector-General could now examine wider strategic 
questions that would concern the employment and disposition of all 
African forces, beyond the more parochial ones that would have 
existed before. As with any administrative innovations undertaken 
during this period, there was a persistent shortage of funds and, 
therefore, manpower. 
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Brigadier C.C. Norman, the first Inspector-General of the KAR 
and the RWAFF (1931-1936), was primarily concerned with saving 
money for the financially hard-pressed British Government in the 
middle of the world Depression.2 He and a Royal Air Force (RAF) 
officer, Air Vice-Marshal C.L.N. Newall, recommended drastic changes 
to the force structure in east and central Africa in order to save money 
and take advantage of the technology, " ... of modern aircraft 
development." 
The Newall-Norman Report began by reviewing the existing 
situation. Conditions were quiet, but the civil police had been 
reduced to a minimum and had no reserves. The Report 
recommended, therefore, that the police should have the 
assistance not only of the KAR, but of an organized air arm and 
local defense force. The nomadic tribes in British territory along 
the Abyssinian border had now been disarmed, but were still 
subject to sporadic raids, which military garrisons were too 
scattered and weak to prevent. The Report recommended that 
for this purpose aircraft should be used in conjunction with 
police, and the military forces withdrawn. 3 
The proposed cuts would have reduced the strength of the 
1 See correspondence in Inspector-General's tour of East Africa, 1937. PRO CAB 
820/25/12. 
2 Lt. Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett, The Kin~'s African Rifles, p. 464. 
3 Lt. Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett, The Kin~'s African Rifles, p. 466. 
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forces in east and central Africa from seven battalions (six KAR and 
one NRR) to four with a squadron of aircraft to make up for the lost 
ground forces in this early version of a rapid deployment force. The 
argument could be seen as an analogy to the merits of the policeman 
on the beat against the policeman in a patrol car. The size and 
numbers of the KAR battalions, and the size of the NRR were very 
small anyway, and the number of British officers available for them 
even smaller so that Royal Marine officers had to be seconded. 4 
The Newall-Norman Report, overtaken by events, was never 
implemented to the relief of the soldiers and others familiar with 
Africa who were skeptical of the idea of askaris being flown to hot 
spots instead of patrolling them. The ideas expressed were not 
altogether unpopular with settlers and the administrations in the 
territories to the north of Southern Rhodesia where defense costs 
were mandated by London, but paid for out of local revenues, "It was 
not easy to persuade the governments of the colonial territories to 
accept a comprehensive view. The whole history of their military 
affairs is one of violent fluctuations between drastic economy and hasty 
rearmament. "5 
In 1936 Major-General G.J. Giffard became Inspector-General of 
African Colonial Forces and in 1937 made his first tour of the African 
Colonial Forces. This was also the year that saw the beginning of the 
reorganization of the NRR, separating it completely from its police 
past so that it became a regular colonial infantry battalion. Beyond this 
4 James Lunt, Imperial Sunset, p. 220. 
5 James Lunt, Imperial Sunset, pp. 205-206. 
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administrative reform in his bailiwick, Major-General Giffard's chief 
concern was the Italian invasion of Ethiopia which 0 ••• brought home to 
the Colonial Governments and their Legislatures that there was a 
threat and that it was not far from their borders. "6 
The Italo-Abyssinian war threw the northern frontier of Kenya 
into a turmoil. As the Italian armies swept across the country, 
refugees with their herds of stock, armed bandits and deserters 
came pouring into the Northern Frontier District. Troops had to 
be called upon to support the police; 3 KAR (relieved later by 5 
KAR) were at Meru and forward detachments were again 
established at Wajir, Mandera, Moyale, and Malka Murri. 
Meanwhile, as similar disturbances were expected on the 
frontiers of British Somaliland ... 1 
Giffard's strategic problems were peripherally complicated by 
the Third Reich's intrusion in African affairs in the form of "Hitler's 
extravagant demands for the return of the former German colonies 
[which] were not without their effect on the German settlers in 
Tanganyika. "8 This was a demand that was soon dropped as Hitler's 
territorial ambitions were entirely directed towards Europe. It did 
have the effect of scaring South Africa and Britain. From the point of 
view of the professional infantzy soldier, things were looking up. 
However, the years between the two world wars had not been 
kind to the British Army; the problem was not in finding enough 
Africans to join the KAR, NRR or the RWAFF, which had always been 
manned by volunteers, but finding enough qualified officers and senior 
NCOs to lead them. There was no question in the eyes of the planners 
6 James Lunt, Imoerial Sunset. p. 220. 
7 Lt. Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett, The Kin~'s African Rifles, p. 467. 
8 Lt. Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett, The Kin~'s African Rifles, p. 467. 
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that the best people to do this were whites who were familiar with 
Africans and their ways. 
Part of the solution was to create Territorial, or reserve, units 
for settlers like the Kenya Regiment (KR) which was raised in 1937.9 
The function of the KR was to act as a leader's training unit, to assist 
the Kenya Defense Force and provide reservists for the internal 
security of the Colony. 10 In Northern Rhodesia, the newly created NRR 
had its own Reserve of Officers. 11 However, it was realized that the 
Kenyan settlers could not supply the complete manpower needs 
visualized by Giffard. 
The British Government, and Giffard, approached the 
Government of Southern Rhodesia to find the additional leadership for 
the colonial forces that would be needed when and if a general war 
broke out. As an example of cooperation between two governments, it 
was probably one of the best in the British Empire and resulted in a 
policy that expanded and changed the role of the Rhodesia Regiment . 
... it was decided to reorganize the Forces so that the Defense 
Force should not only be prepared for internal security, but also 
take part in action overseas. Each battalion of the Rhodesia 
Regiment was reformed into two groups so as to be able to carry 
out their new roles. The Permanent Staff Corps was increased to 
22 officers and 25 other ranks to assist in the specialist training 
necessary. 12 
9 "In all over 3,500 members of the Regiinent joined the East African Forces. Of 
these more than 1,500 were commissioned as officers in the battalions of the King's 
African Rifles from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Nyasaland, and in the Northern 
Rhodesia Regiment." Campbell, The Charging Buffalo, p. 27. 
10 Sir Guy Campbell, The Chargin~ Buffalo. A History of the Kenya Regiinent, p. 
17. 
11 W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiinent, pp. 73-74. 
12 A Brief History of the Rhodesia Army, p. 9. 
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General Giffard put forward recommendations which completely 
changed the Rhodesia Regiment as a unit. Hitherto the regiment had 
been nothing more than two under-strength reserve battalions of 
infantry, but it was now to become a leaders' training unit, like the 
KR, that supplied officers, NCOs and other specialists, not only to be 
dispersed around the British Army, but primarily to the African 
Colonial Forces. 13 The leadership needs of the NRR expanded as the 
Regiment grew from one to eight battalions during the Second World 
War. 14 The KAR's expansion was just as spectacular. 15 
In 1938 the Southern Rhodesian Defense Force, which included 
the Colony's Air Unit, numbered nine Permanent Staff Corps officers 
and forty-five 'Other Ranks', or enlisted personnel, who served as 
instructors. The two battalions of the Rhodesia Regiment, when fully 
mobilized, numbered around 600 men " ... and the compulsory system 
of registration for military service has built up a considerable reserve 
13 "The Rhodesian contingent arrived in November 1939 in all [west African] 
colonies to bring existing forces up to establishment. They were all Rhodesian 
territorials and knew very little militarily; but they did know a lot about Africans. 
They made a tremendous contribution to the RWAFF ... " Lunt, Imperial Sunset, pp. 195-
196. 
14 1 NRR fought at the Battle of Tug Argan, British Somaliland (August 1940) but 
not in the Abyssinian campaign of 1940-41. 1 NRR later served in Burma with the 11th 
(East African) Division, in 1944-45. 3 NRR served in Burma in the 22nd (East African) 
Brigade. The other battalions of the NRR served out the war doing garrison duty in 
Palestine, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Somalia. Lunt, Imperial Sunset, p. 303. 
15 "By VJ day the original six battalions [of the KAR] had expanded to forty-
three; there were also six independent garrison companies and three Division 
Headquarters Protection Companies. ' ... the maximum war effort ever achieved as a 
whole was the provision and maintenance of a complete division plus two brigades in 
Burma during the operations of 1944-45, at a time when the internal security of vast 
territories on the [African] Continent and in Madagascar had also to be safeguarded."' 
Lunt, Imperial Sunset, p. 223. 
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behind them." 16 The BSAP consisted of twenty-three Officers and 463 
Other Ranks. While not an overwhelming number of men, it was large 
by the standards of a relatively small African territory, and did not 
escape the notice of the Committee of Imperial Defense-Oversea 
Defense Committee (CID-ODC) in London, whom Southern Rhodesia 
dealt with on mutual defense matters. 
Southern Rhodesia, perhaps more than any of the other colonies 
or dominions, enjoyed a very close emotional relationship with the 
mother country. Whether it was because they were not ruled from 
London, which probably gave Rhodesians a kinder view of Britain, a 
view not always shared by settlers in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, or 
because of the residual of ill-feeling between Rhodesians, as 
·Englishmen', and the Afrikaner-dominated Union of South Africa, or 
the large number of British ex-servicemen in Southern Rhodesia, is 
outside of the scope of this study. The fact is that they took pride in 
being an active part of the British Empire. An indication of this, 
according to CID-ODC, was Southern Rhodesia's willingness to give 
their all, seemingly without any reservations: 
Should the British Empire be involved in war, Southern 
Rhodesia would be ready and eager to place such of her forces as 
could be spared at the disposal of the United Kingdom 
Government for service where most required. 17 
While this sentiment was being expressed, the practical needs 
of the British Government in the face of the rising threat from Italy 
and Germany, was beginning to conflict with Southern Rhodesia's 
16 OOC Minute No. 305, 1938, p. 2. PRO CAB 10/9. 
17 OOC Minute No. 305, 1938, p. 2. PRO CAB 10/9. 
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objection to having African soldiers. The practical solution of having 
armed Africans to fight in the War would win out, given the small 
number of whites on both sides of the Zambezi, but until that time the 
British Government deferred to Rhodesian sensibilities. Under the 
heading "Internal Security" a CID-ODC document in 1938 stated: 
Southern Rhodesia is preponderantly an area for white 
settlement, and the African population, which is relatively small 
compared with that in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, is 
mainly concentrated in the reserves. 
The B.S.A. police, supported in time of emergency by the 
Southern Rhodesia Defense Force, (two battalions of European 
Territorial infantry recruited on a compulsory basis), provide an 
adequate force for the maintenance of internal security. A 
situation calling for assistance by African troops from Northern 
Rhodesia or Nyasaland to maintain or restore order in Southern 
Rhodesia is unlikely to arise. Moreover, the Committee 
understand that the Government of Southern Rhodesia would 
not agree to the employment of African troops, since they are 
opposed to the placing of arms in the hands of Africans. The 
maintenance of internal security in this Colony may therefore be 
considered adequately provided for under the existing 
organization. 18 
In the same document the CID-ODC outlined the tactical and 
strategic problems facing the British colonies in east Africa and the 
forces available to defend them in the face of possible Italian 
aggression. 
Italy has announced publicly the strength of the permanent 
garrison which she intends to maintain in Italian East Africa, 
including Abyssinia, and this far exceeds the forces which the 
British Dependencies on her borders can maintain in time of 
peace . 
. . . Although the scale of attack may not, for various reasons, be 
as heavy as first sight might appear likely, it would probably be 
heavier than the forces immediately available in Kenya, Uganda 
and Somaliland could withstand without assistance . 
. . . arrangements have been made for the co-operation of all the 
forces in Central and East Africa to meet the contingency of 
18 ODC Minute No. 300, 1938, pp. 1-2. PRO CAB 10/9. 
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Italian attack. All the local forces are being organized, equipped 
and armed on identical lines to facilitate this co-operation. 19 
Having outlined the situation, it went on to outline the problems 
which faced them, especially as it concerned the issue of white 
versus black soldiers. 
It will be convenient here to point out that the last war in East 
Africa showed that only units composed of Africans with white 
leaders were suitable for service in tropical Africa ... It was not 
possible to maintain European and Indian units in a proper state 
of health. 
The defense of the British African territories, which lie 
mainly in the tropical belt, must, therefore, be maintained by 
African units.20 
The process of transformation in Southern Rhodesia's defense 
establishment was such that by December 1941 the process of turning 
the two battalions of the Rhodesia Regiment into a training unit like 
the Kenya Regiment, was completed. The 3rd and 4th Battalions were 
raised, trained, and disbanded to form the training, or Depot 
Companies, of the 1st and 2nd Battalions.21 Southern Rhodesia 
produced enough men so that by the end of the war around 10,000 
white Rhodesians served in the British forces which were ultimately 
drawn from Southern Rhodesia's white population of 67,000.22 
19 ODC Minute No. 300, 1938, pp. 4-5. PRO CAB 10/9. 
20 ODC Minute No. 300, 1938, p. 5. PRO CAB 10/9. 
21 A Brief History of the Rhodesia Army, p. 10. 
22 Total white males were 9,187 of whom 6,520 served outside of Southern 
Rhodesia. Total white females were 1,510 of whom 137 served outside of Southern 
Rhodesia. There were 271 Colored males of whom 228 seIVed outside of Southern 
Rhodesia and 15,153 male Africans of whom 1,503 who served outside of the Colony. Of 
this total, eight were killed in action, either in the Royal Navy or the South African 
Navy, 407 were KIA in the Army and 498 in the RAF. Three women were killed. J.F. 
MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 2, Appendix, p. i. 
CHAPTER VIII 
WHITE RHODESIAN UNITS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
While the Southern Rhodesian War Diary is full of endless 
examples of the dispersion of Rhodesians throughout the British 
Army, there were only two all-white Rhodesian fighting units formed 
in Southern Rhodesia during the war, although there were others 
formed in various theaters where Rhodesians were concentrated. 1 
Giffard's recommendations for the reorganization of Southern 
Rhodesia's defense establishment, called for " ... a mechanized 
[artillery] battery and an armored fighting vehicle unit, which would 
absorb personnel not required, or unsuitable, for training as European 
leaders for native units."2 The CID-ODC recommended that the 
Southern Rhodesians form a reconnaissance unit of trucks in Lieu of 
receiving armored vehicles, which would " ... in all circumstances, be 
more appropriate to the resources and condition of service in 
1 "13.4.40 Southern Rhodesian contingent for Middle East and United Kingdom. 
32 Officers, 11 WOs, 134 NCOs, 579 ORs left for embarkation at Durban on the 16th en 
route for Egypt." In this group one complete mechanized artillery battery and one 
mechanized Reconnaissance unit were sent. There were Engineers, Signalers, machine 
gunners, five companies of infantry (to be distributed amongst nine British infantry 
regiments), and various staff officers. On the 25th December 1939, the War Diary 
records that there were Rhodesian Officers and NCOs in Iraq, British Somaliland, 
Nigeria, Gold Coast, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Tanganyika. PRO WO 333 I I. 
2 ODC Minute No. 305, Cooperation of Southern Rhodesia in Imperial Defense, 
1938, p. 3. PRO CAB 10/9. 
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Southern Rhodesia."3 
However, this was for the future and the plans that would bring 
about these changes did not come into full focus until the outbreak of 
war fourteen months later. The CID-ODC, while primarily interested in 
bringing the African Colonial Forces up to strength in white officers 
and NCOs, recognized the fact that not Rhodesians were of the right 
stuff to lead African soldiers. The CID-ODC supported the idea of 
dispersing them throughout the British Army: 
The Committee, however, fully agree with the view of the 
Inspector-General that it would be wasteful to employ European 
infantry as reinforcements in other parts of Africa where 
climactic conditions are unsuitable for their use. Other and 
better employment could be found for this valuable material 
from Southern Rhodesia. 4 
The first all-white Rhodesian units made their appearances in 
the 1940 Report on Defense. As mentioned above, these units would 
survive, to be disbanded and reformed, in one form or another by a 
later Rhodesian Army. 
Full-Time units within the Colony. 
1. Southern Rhodesia Reconnaissance Unit. 
After the departure of the drafts to the Middle East in April, this 
unit was left without personnel with the exception of two 
officers lent to the colony from the [British] Regular Army. Some 
time elapsed before this deficiency could be made good, due in 
part to the fact that the camp set aside for this unit at Umtali 
was not ready for occupation. The buildings, however, were 
pushed on with great speed, and by the end of the year the unit 
had, to a great extent, been reorganized, trained and equipped. 
3 ODC Minute No. 305, Cooperation of Southern Rhodesia in Imperial Defense. 
1938, p. 5. PRO CAB 10/9. 
4 ODC Minute No. 305, Cooperation of Southern Rhodesia in Imperial Defense. 
1938, p. 3. PRO CAB 10/9. 
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2. Light Battery. 
Personnel for this unit was provided and trained in a similar 
manner, but during the year the nucleus, followed by drafts, was 
required for the S.R. Anti-Tank Battery in East Africa, and 
consequently the end of the year found the Light Battery for the 
most part in training with new personnel for the third time. 
3. Southern Rhodesia Medical Corps. 
This unit carried on its training as a Depot, and when 
accommodation was ready it was quartered in King George VI 
Barracks. Apart from the general depot training and the 
provision of trained personnel for the Base Hospital in East 
Africa and the Rhodesia Air Training Group, the unit proceeded 
to form a motorized Field Ambulance, which in 1941, when 
accommodation is ready, will be stationed in Umtali with the 
Reece Unit. 
4. Signal Company. 
The Training of this unit, which is to produce signalers to the 
standard of the Royal Corps of Signals, has proceeded steadily. 
Whilst providing drafts of signalers for duty outside the colony, it 
is also producing and will shortly have ready, signalers who will 
operate on a mechanized basis with S.R. Reece Unit. 
5. General. 
In addition to the general training and drafting activities of all 
full-time units, when combined, they form within the Colony a 
mechanized striking force. 5 
In February 1941, some Rhodesians were withdrawn from 
British units in Egypt.6 They were transferred to Kenya where the 
Southern Rhodesia Armored Car Regiment was being formed as an all-
Rhodesian unit as the British offensive was getting under way in 
5 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 1, p. 131. 
6 They came from the 11th Hussars, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, the 
Durham Light Infantry, the Buffs (Royal West Kent Regiment), the Sherwood Foresters, 
the Leicestershire Regiment, and the Argyle & Sutherland Highlanders. MacDonald, 
War HistoIV, Vol. 1, p. 155. 
Ethiopia, " ... an offensive in which, to their disgust, the Rhodesian 
Armored Cars could not take part. "7 
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The regiment's job for almost the next two years consisted of 
garrison duty in the occupied Italian territories of East Africa. They 
assisted in the evacuation of prisoners and civilians, doing convoy 
protection, reconnaissance work and, because they were split into 
their sub units, were dispersed over northern Kenya, Sudan, Abyssinia 
and Eritrea. 8 
They were the first Southern Rhodesian unit to be affected by 
the decision to unify the command of Southern Rhodesia's forces with 
South Africa's Union Defense Force on the 22nd October 1942. They 
drove back to Southern Rhodesia where they were told by R.C. 
Tredgold MP, Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Defense, that they 
would be absorbed into the South African Army as a Rhodesian unit.9 In 
November 1942, the regiment, 550 strong, moved to the South 
African province of Natal where they drew South African uniforms and, 
in Januazy 1943, embarked at Durban for Egypt where they joined the 
South African forces. They eventually received tanks and served in the 
Italian campaign. 10 
The next area of expertise which Rhodesians acquired was in 
7 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 1, p. 155. 
8 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 1, pp. 
253-254. 
9 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 2, pp. 
372-373. 
10 They were divided up into three Squadrons and went to the Pretoria Regiment 
(Princess Alice's Own), Prince Alfred's Guard and the Special Service Battalion 
(Permanent Force Regiment), all part of the 12th (South African) Armored Brigade, 6th 
(South African) Armored Division. MacDonald, The War History , Vol. 2, p. 398. 
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artillery which " ... owing to the heavy demand at the present time on 
the armament industry of the United Kingdom, some time must 
inevitably elapse before 3. 7" Howitzers for a mechanized battery and 
vehicles for an armored fighting vehicles could be made available ... "11 
As they were to form part of the British Army, the cost for equipping, 
instructing and supporting the units and men involved, would 
ultimately fall on the British Government. 
The War Diary for the 27th of September 1940, the 4th 
(Rhodesian) Anti-Tank Battery, consisting of a skeleton crew of one 
officer and eighteen other ranks left for Nairobi to prepare for the 
formation of the unit which would be provided with drafts from the 
training units of Southern Rhodesia. 12 They were formed into the 4th 
(Southern Rhodesia) Anti-Tank Battery, which was brought up to 
strength by drafts from Southern Rhodesia, equipped with two-
pounders, and joined the 12th (African) Division at the end of 1940. 13 
In April 1940, Rhodesian signalers went to the British 7th Armored 
Division, 'the Desert Rats.' 14 In May 1941 the Anti-Tank Battery was 
sent to Egypt and by September was incorporated into a British 
11 ODC Minute No. 305, Cooperation of Southern Rhodesia in Imperial Defense, 
1938, p. 4. PRO CAB 10/9. 
12 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia, 1939-45, Vol. 1, p. 
130. 
13 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia, 1939-45, Vol. 1, p. 
157. 
14 They formed 'H' Troop of the 3rd Royal Horse Artillery, the division's only 
anti-tank regiment, and 'R' Troop of the division's Support Group. MacDonald, War 
History, Vol. l, p. 54. 
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artillery regiment. 15 
In May 1940 the Medical Corps supplied the staff to form 'No. 2 
General Hospital (Southern Rhodesia)' in Nairobi. Like the other 
Rhodesian contributions to the war effort, it became a considerable 
investment of manpower, presumably in anticipation of expected 
casualties of the Ethiopian campaign, " ... it had been expected that 
General Cunningham's offensive would fill the wards, but although few 
beds in the great three story building were empty, yet not many of the 
patients were actual battle casualties. "16 There were around two 
hundred and fifty Rhodesian officers and a thousand other ranks 
manning the hospital who were eventually relieved and posted 
elsewhere in July, 1943 when the hospital was taken over by the 
Brttish. 11 Many of the Rhodesians would eventually end up in India and 
Burma.18 
Another excellent example of the ongoing willingness of the 
Southern Rhodesian government to cooperate with the manpower 
wishes of the British Army was the number of Rhodesians who served 
in two of the most famous special force units to come out of the 
Second World War; the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) and the 
Special Air Service (SAS), both of which were formed in Egypt in 
15 The 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment, Northumberland Hussars. MacDonald, War 
History, Vol. l, p. 276. 
16 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 1, pp. 
167-168. 
17 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 1, pp. 
252-253. 
18 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia, 1939-45, Vol. 2, p. 
420. 
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1940 and 1941 respectively. Because Southern Rhodesia had no large 
national formations there was no political pressure, as was the case 
with the New Zealanders and the LRDG, that prevented small groups 
of Rhodesians from volunteering and serving with both units for the 
duration of the war: 
... the fears of their Government at home about keeping the [New 
Zealand] Division up to strength that had prompted them to 
consider removing our Squadron. I also said that, unless we 
could get a guarantee of continued maintenance of the NZ 
Squadron up to establishment, we would be far wiser to let them 
go. In that case we should try to get a Rhodesian Squadron if we 
could. 19 
By way of contrast, the Government of Southern Rhodesia was 
more than happy to have the LRDG make use of their men: 
It was a stroke of good luck which brought Sir Ernest Lucas 
Guest, the Rhodesian Air Minister, on a visit to the Middle East 
at that time. During his tour he came to see our Rhodesian 
contingent. He was full of understanding, and I took to him. I 
did all I could to persuade him that in future the LRDG ought to 
have a Squadron of Rhodesians. I could think of no better 
substitute for the men from New Zealand.20 
As it happened, the formation of the Rhodesian squadron in the 
LRDG coincided with the move to establish Rhodesian subunits in the 
6th (South African) Armored Division which was being formed in 
South Africa at around the same time. A serving Rhodesian officer 
from the LRDG went to Southern Rhodesia on a recruiting drive, and 
after a special training course, " ... under an agreement reached 
between Commander-in-Chief, S.A. Command and the Commander 
19 Maj. Gen. D.L. Lloyd-Owen, Providence Their Guide, p. 151. 
20 Maj. Gen. D.L. Lloyd-Owen, Providence Their Guide, p. 151. 
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Military Forces, the men selected proceeded to the Middle East. "21 
The LRDG led the Rhodesians into contact with the SAS which 
was being shuttled across the desert by them until they were able to 
organize their own transportation. The man who was responsible for 
reintroducing Southern Rhodesia to the SAS after the war was Major 
J.M. Calvert. He was presumably so impressed with the caliber of the 
Rhodesians he had served with, that he was determined to have them 
take part in the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s as an integral part of 
the SAS which was being reformed in the British Army.22 Rhodesians 
were thus kept abreast of military developments, and were thought 
highly enough of, to be included in British Army plans for the future. 
The tradition of innovation from below and links with the British were 
strengthened by the war. 
21 Southern Rhodesia Annual Report on Defense for 1943, p. 73. Annual Report 
on Defense for 1939-45. British Library (CS. D.) 
22 'A' Squadron, 22 SAS was formed from British Army volunteers in Malaya, 
'B' Squadron was formed from volunteers from the reserve unit, 21 SAS Regiment 
(Artists) (V), which had taken over the title and battle honors of the Artist Rifles, a 
London regiment. The Rhodesian Far East Volunteer Unit became 'C' Squadron and 
was commanded by Major Peter Walls, the future COMOPs commander. When it was 
added to the Rhodesian Army in 1962, it was known as 'C' Squadron, Rhodesian SAS 
Regiment. To this day 22 SAS does not have a 'C' Squadron. James Shortt, The Special 
Air Service, pp. 18-19. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE QUEST FOR AIR POWER; 
the Rhodesian Air Force, 1934-1945 
The quest for Rhodesian air power began in 1934 when 
members of the Southern Rhodesian parliament expressed a desire to 
contribute something towards the defense of the British Empire. The 
Rhodesian parliamentary debate, reported in the Rhodesia Herald and 
included as part of a report to the Council for Imperial Defense, 
indicates the number of former military men present in Southern 
Rhodesia. The expression, 'Officers to Kenya, Sergeants to Rhodesia' 
is more indicative of the social standing of Kenya's settlers than 
anything else, but the fact that both colonies' were the destination of 
so many former soldiers is significant. Kenya and Southern Rhodesia 
had long attracted former soldiers for a variety of reasons, and the end 
of the First World War saw a large influx of them into both colonies. 
Kenya had the reputation of attracting upper class settlers, one of the 
few in the British Empire to do so, while in Rhodesia the social tone 
was set a little lower. It meant that there was already a significant body 
of men with military experience. In the case of Kenya, a tour of duty 
with the KAR occasionally caused a seconded officer to resign his 
commission and settle there. 
In any case, it was from a genuine, albeit quaintly expressed, 
desire to help Britain and the Empire during the depth of the 
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Depression, that heralded the beginnings of the Rhodesian Air Force. 
The parliamentary debate of April 1934 came up with an offer to 
donate £10,000 from the tax revenues of Southern Rhodesia to the 
Royal Navy. The thinking was that this sum, the interest on which 
could pay for one light cruiser, would be a "debt of honor" more than 
anything else, a gesture by Rhodesians to a force that was doing so 
much to keep the sea lanes open and preserve peace. While the voices 
in the House were raised in favor of the Navy, there were also those 
who, while they were willing to give the money to the Royal Navy, 
brought up the possibility of a local air defense unit of some kind. 
Colonel T. Nangle (Salisbury District, Reform Party) supported 
the principle of the motion, but moved an amendment to make 
the motion wider so that it would include the Air Force. He 
asked that the Prime Minister should get in touch with the 
Imperial Defense Committee and consult with them as to the 
allocation of the money. Colonial-born boys, he said, took to the 
air and during the war 80 percent of the flying men [in the Royal 
Flying Corps] were Colonial born. 1 
The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Godfrey Huggins 
visited London that year and met the CID-ODC in order to discuss 
mutual defense issues.2 He was told by Lord Hailsham, Secretary of 
State for War, that the sum would be far better spent on developing 
1 Extract from Press Report from the Rhodesia Herald, Thursday April 26th, 
1934, as sent as an enclosure to the Imperial Defense Committee. PRO CAB 16I11 7. 
2 Dr. Godfrey M. Huggins was the fourth Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia 
and the first Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia & Nyasaland. He was 
knighted in 1945, and was created Viscount Malvern in 1955. From 1923 until the end 
of white rule in 1979 there were eight Prime Ministers of Southern Rhodesia: Sir 
Charles Coghlan (1923-27), Herbert Moffat (1927-33), George Mitchell (1933), Godfrey 
Huggins (1933-53), R.S. Garfield Tcxld (1953-58), Sir Edgar Whitehead (1958-63), 
Winston Field ( 1963-64), and Ian Douglas Smith ( 1964-79). The title of Premier was used 
until 1933 when, after the Imperial Conference in Ottawa, the heads of government of 
Dominions and Self-Governing Colonies were to be known as Prime Ministers. For 
simplicity's sake, the latter title will be used throughout. Breslsford, The Handbook of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, pp. 774-779. 
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Rhodesia's human military potential: 
It was necessary that the Territorial Force should be as efficient 
as possible, and he hoped nothing would be done to detract 
from the military training of that force. The type of man in it was 
eminently suited for military purposes ... 3 
Presumably having it swallowed up in the vast budget of the 
Royal Navy, quite apart from the fact that Southern Rhodesia has no 
coast line, was seen as misusing the best part of Southern Rhodesia's 
slim resources, which consisted of a reasonably well educated 
community, many of whom lived on the 'frontier'. The Air Minister 
spoke for air power: 
Lord LONDONDERRY suggested that whereas a part of the sum 
would be of little practical value to the Navy, yet with £10,000 it 
was possible to start the nucleus of a local Air Force which would 
be of real value. 4 
From a purely political point of view, Huggins " ... doubted 
whether local opinion would be fully satisfied if the sum were merely 
paid out as a contribution to Imperial Defense with no visible result in 
the Colony."5 
The subject of the Southern Rhodesia's small Defense Force 
came up again, not only from Lord Hailsham and Lord Londonderry's 
Air Ministry who offered the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister " ... to 
give all possible help on whatever scheme were to be adopted. If it was 
decided to start a small air unit in Southern Rhodesia, a nucleus of 
3 Minutes of Imperial Defense Committee meeting, 31 July 1934. PRO CAB 
16/117. 
4 Minutes of Imperial Defense Committee meeting, 31 July 1934. PRO CAB 
16/117. 
5 Minutes of Imperial Defense Committee meeting, 31 July 1934. PRO CAB 
16/117. 
whole time personnel would be required and a small number of 
seconded officers from the RAF could be made available. "6 
Prime Minister Huggins' reaction was to repeat the Rhodesian 
view to the CID-ODC that ·· ... the Territorial Force was intended to 
serve primarily for their own protection. It was regarded as a local 
Defense Force rather than as an Imperial Force, although, of course, 
its personnel might be available for Imperial purposes if the need 
arose."7 Because of the unstable world economic situation, Southern 
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Rhodesia was also cutting back on defense expenditure, which meant 
cutting back on numbers of men and training in the already small 
Defense Force ..... apart from that he did not think that the efficiency of 
the force had suffered in any way as the economies had largely been 
effected by a reduction of surplus personnel."8 
The main question on which he wished advice was whether the 
sum of £10,000 should be handed over as a gift to the Treasury, 
to be spent on Imperial Defense as a whole, or whether it would 
be more usefully employed by the establishment of a Territorial 
Flying unit. 9 
The lack of a wider strategic vision is clearly shown in Huggins' 
statement, although it is obvious that his instincts were correct. His 
concerns were picked up by the Army Commander, Field Marshal Sir 
Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd and he, Huggins, was reassured 
6 Minutes of Imperial Defense Committee meeting, 31 July 1934. PRO CAB 
16/117. 
7 Minutes of Imperial Defense Committee meeting, 31July1934. PRO CAB 
16/117. 
8 Minutes of Imperial Defense Committee meeting, 31July1934. PRO CAB 
16/117. 
9 Minutes of Imperial Defense Committee meeting, 31 July 1934. PRO CAB 
16/117. 
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that Southern Rhodesia was important to any future British war effort: 
• Sir Archibald MONTGOMERY-MASSINGBERD said that the War 
Office regarded the Territorial Force in Southern Rhodesia as a 
most valuable potential reserve of officers; from that point of 
view the force had not merely local significance but was an 
Imperial Asset. 10 
The British Air Ministry and the Secretary of State for War, after 
a half-hearted attempt by the Navy to get the £10,000, proposed 
setting up a 'Southern Rhodesia Air Unit' (SRAU) of minuscule size, to 
be paid for by the Southern Rhodesian Government. The SRAU would 
not only spend the money in question on itself, but the unit would 
eventually contribute to the Colony's defense establishment. The RAF 
would benefit, as they would be able to use the personnel trained 
under the scheme, and be able to send their own officers and NCOs to 
Southern Rhodesia and thus spread their costs. The RAF were 
suffering from the same financial restrictions as the Rhodesians. 
It is proposed to have an annual intake of six candidates who 
volunteer for training in flying duties on a Territorial basis. They 
will be required to undertake to serve for a period of five years 
on the active list and five years on the reserve. It is estimated 
that the course of training will take two years and that the RAF 
standard will be adhered to. 
From the above it is hoped to gradually build up a reserve of 
pilots who have been fully trained. To attain this a Flight 
Lieutenant and a Flight Officer holding CFS and other 
qualifications will be required to be seconded from the RAF to , 
the Permanent Staff Corps (Air Section) for a period of three 
years as instructors. 11 
In 1936 the Government began the air training scheme at 
10 Minutes of Imperial Defense Committee meeting, 31 July 1934. PRO CAB 
16/117. 
11 Letter from Sir H.J. Stanley to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
No. 339, Confidential, 10th July 1936. PRO CAB 21 /642. 
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Cranborne, on the outskirts of Salisbury, and flight training was 
conducted by the local civilian flying school; flight training was also 
begun in Bulawayo. In August 1937, seconded RAF personnel began 
their training program and the " ... new service expanded rapidly, as it 
made a strong appeal to Rhodesian youth."12 
Training in elementary flying was carried out on that most 
dependable of aircraft, the De Havilland Tiger Moth .... From 
Tiger Moths the young Rhodesian graduated to more advanced 
flying in Hawker Harts, which even in 1939 were regarded as a 
trifle antiquated. 13 
In 1936 Group Captain A.T. Harris visited Southern Rhodesia at 
the invitation of Prime Minister Huggins. Harris recommended that 
the SRAU ... 
... should be established by following the gradual introduction of a 
number of formative stages, each one designed to build and 
expand on the strength of the previous stage. Following the 
establishment of a nucleus staff there would be a provision for 
the training of skilled technical personnel so that the "SRAU" 
could itself become self-perpetuating in the production of 
skilled personnel. 14 
The establishment of the SRAU eventually fit very smoothly into 
British plans, both strategic and political. In July 1939, during another 
visit to the United Kingdom, Huggins heard that the British wanted to 
establish a full blown-training program for the RAF. Not only would 
distance from Europe assure that flight training could proceed safely, 
but the proximity of South Africa " ... would encourage a number of 
12 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 1, p. 13. 
13 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 1, p. 13. 
14 Hugh Morgan, By the Seat ofYour Pants, p. 11. 
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recruits to cross the border. "15 Britain's relationship with the Union of 
South Africa, as we shall see, was not a happy one in the years leading 
up to the War. 
Within three weeks of the outbreak of the Second World War, five 
hundred men joined the Southern Rhodesian Air Force (SRAF) which 
consisted of No. 1 (Cadre) Squadron at the Flying School at Cranborne. 
It only had of thirteen aircraft, twenty-one staff personnel and fifty 
men under instruction. The War Diary of Southern Rhodesia recorded 
that: 
Southern Rhodesia Air Force: Survey of information received 
from recruiting campaign indicates the ability to produce 
personnel to man three squadrons and a flying training school. 
Offer made in these terms to Imperial Government accepted. 16 
The RAF was far more prepared, doctrinally at least, to face the 
Luftwaffe than was normally realized. In the area of Close-Air Support 
the Germans had an edge, but as far as aircraft design and organization 
it can be argued that the RAF had the lead. The short explanation is 
that the RAF, unencumbered by history or debilitating traditions, was 
able to organize itself to meet the challenge of a future war. Part of the 
RAF's preparation came in the form of the Empire Air Training Plan 
(EATP). By way of contrast, the Luftwaffe, as a creation of the Third 
Reich, became the political bailiwick of Hermann Goring and suffered 
15 Hugh Morgan, By the Seat ofYour Pants, p. 11. 
16 J.F. MacDonald, The War Histozy of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 1, p. 32. 
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as a consequence. 17 
The EATP was originally conceived of in a 1936 memorandum by 
Group Captain Robert Leckie, a Canadian who had opted to remain 
with the RAF after the First World War. This document, written with 
Canada in mind, was seen by Leckie's superior officer, Group Captain 
Arthur Tedder, later to become Marshal of the RAF during the war. 
The advantages of having Canada as a training ground for RAF 
personnel included its relative proximity to the United Kingdom and 
especially to the United States with its large industrial base. 18 This also 
meant that RAF pilots and crew could train safely in weather 
conditions not unlike that of northern Europe. 
Unlike the Rhodesians, the Canadians did not immediately jump 
at the possibility of closer cooperation with the British. While the 
Rhodesians were more than eager to allow the SRAF to become an 
adjunct to the RAF the Canadians were not prepared to let the Royal 
Canadian Air Force become an adjunct to the RAF. Recommendations 
by Group Captain J.M. Robb, Commanding Officer of the RAF's Central 
Flying School, to have an RAF scheme that would train 300 Canadian 
pilots a year was rejected by Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie-
King. He felt that such a scheme would not only be a drain on Canadian 
manpower, but from the point of view of Canada's national pride, 
Canadians serving in the RAF would be denied their own identity as 
17 See Harold Faber's Luftwaffe. An analysis by former Luftwaffe "enerals for a 
more complete analysis. "Hitler was not much interested in air power and left Goring a 
free hand as long as things went well. After the period of spectacular initial success, 
Goring suffered a sharp decline in influence, and the Fuhrer interjected himself into the 
Luftwaffe's management. He was not helpful; his decisions were the product of 
ignorance and favoritism and simply completed the process of demoralization." p. xvi. 
18 Hugh Morgan, By the Seat ofYour Pants, p. 39. 
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had been the case in the First World War. 19 
If the Second World War was one of those events that further 
defined the national identity of the older Dominions, it seems to have 
bound Rhodesians emotionally closer to Britain, while at the same 
time giving greater definition to a Rhodesian identity. While the 
Canadians were balking at the thought of more British military 
influence, the Southern Rhodesian government offered to establish 
two more flight schools which would have brought the total number in 
the colony to twelve. This was turned down by the RAF who were 
anxious that the Canadian connection be developed as they had their 
eye on a potential link with the United States and the obvious benefits 
that this could off er. 20 
The RAF became an umbrella organization that accepted 
personnel from the Empire and integrated them into their own 
formations without necessarily concentrating men in units according 
to nationality. While this integration took place, squadrons that had a 
large number of one or other nationality, be they Americans, Czechs, 
Belgians, Canadians or others, would be given a nationality title after 
the squadron's number. Thus it was that while Southern Rhodesia 
started the war with one training squadron there were, in all, enough 
Rhodesians to man three RAF squadrons, although with casualties and 
the ebb and flow of personnel, it was not always possible to maintain 
19 Hugh Morgan, By the Seat of Your Pants, p. 39. 
20 Hugh Morgan, By the Seat ofYour Pants, p. 14. 
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complete national identity within the squadrons.21 The only identifying 
difference between members of the RAF were the shoulder flashes 
which gave the name of the country of the uniform's wearer. 
In January, 1940, Southern Rhodesia's Government Gazette 
announced that a Department of Air, separate from the Ministry of 
Defense, would come into being. 0 The Department of Air is now 
completely separate from that of Defense. All administration and 
command of the Air Force will eventually be undertaken by RAF and 
SRAF personnel."22 In March 1940 Lt. Col. Lucas Guest was appointed 
Air Minister of Southern Rhodesia. On the 17th of January 1941, after 
eighteen months of war, the Rhodesia Herald reported that: 
In the Air Force there were 1,416, including 17 trained pilots in 
[Southern] Rhodesia as instructors and in the communication 
squadrons, and 92 pilots outside the Colony and 259 men in 
training. There were also 64 Rhodesians waiting their turn to be 
absorbed in the Empire training schools. 23 
Given that Southern Rhodesia barely had any airplanes until the 
SRAU was established, the EATP was instrumental in establishing for 
the SRAF the complete range of training currently on offer by the RAF. 
Essentially all the schools were controlled by the Rhodesian Air 
Training Group based at Salisbury who were in close working 
contact with representatives from the Air Ministry in London, 
21 They were: 266 (Rhodesia) Squadron, RAF, formed at Sutton Bridge, 
Lincolnshire on 30th October 1939; No. 1 (Cadre) Squadron, SRAF was redesignated in 
Kenya as 237 (Rhodesia) Squadron, RAF on 22nd April 1940. These were fighter 
squadrons and Ian Smith served with 237 Squadron. No. 44 (Rhodesia) Squadron, RAF, 
a bomber squadron, was formed in March 1937, but was given the "Rhodesia" title in 
September, 1941 because, like 266 Squadron, there were so many Rhodesians being 
posted there. 237 Squadron was the only unit that was originally part of the SRAF. J.F. 
MacDonald, The War Histocy of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-1945, Vol 1, pp. 33, 60, 231-
232. 
22 J.F. MacDonald, The War Histocy of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 1, p. 33. 
23 J.F. MacDonald, The War Histocy of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 1, pp. 
172-173. 
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although in theory, they were directed by the Minister of Air of 
the Southern Rhodesian Government.24 
From the bureaucratic form-filling of the Air Crew Reception 
Center (ACRC), to the Initial Training Wing (ITW) where prospective 
cadet pilots were screened, before being moved into a flight 'Grading' 
course held at an Elementary Flying Training School (EFTS) Southern 
Rhodesia had the full gamut of facilities and personnel. 25 Advanced 
training was held at one of the Service Flying Training School (SFTS) 
and the instructors came from the Flying Instructor School, previously 
named the Central Flying School, which took pilots who were 
"resting" or in-between operational assignments as well as graduates 
from the Southern Rhodesian flight schools. 26 By the end of the war 
approximately 9,900 personnel from all over the British Empire 
(7,600 pilots and 2,300 air crew) had been trained in Southern 
Rhodesia for the RAF in ten stations dotted around the country from 
the time the first training station was opened in May 1940 until April 
1946 when the last station was closed. 27 In all, 2, 409 Rhodesians 
served in the RAF during the War. 28 
24 Hugh Morgan, By the Seat of Your Pants, p. 1. 
25 Hugh Morgan, By the Seat ofYour Pants, p. 13. 
26 Hugh Morgan, By the Seat ofYour Pants, pp. 21-22. 
27 The flight schools were clustered around Salisbury, Bulawayo, and Gwelo and 
evenly divided between EFTS and SFTS. The EFTSs were at Belvedere (25 EFTS), Guinea 
Fowl (26 EFTS), lnduna (27 EFTS), Mount Hampden (28 EFTS), and the ITW at Hillside. 
The SFTSs were at Cran borne (20 SFTS ), Kumalo (21 SFTS ), Thornhill (22 SFTS ), 
Heany (23 SFTS) and Norton (33 FIS), map facing p. 32. Hugh Morgan, By the Seat of 
Your Pants, p. 33. 
28 There were 977 Officers and 1,432 'Other Ranks' from Southern Rhodesia in 
the RAF. The war Histoiy of Southern Rhodesia, 1939-45, Vol. 2, Appendix, p. i. 
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The importance of the SRAF to the Allied war effort is significant 
for the operational and organizational experience gained for the future 
Rhodesian Air Force. When the Rhodesian Air Training Group, which 
had been the organization under which the EATP had functioned in 
Southern Rhodesia, closed down in 1947, the SRAF was reconstituted. 
Simultaneously, a Southern Rhodesia Auxiliary Air Force was created 
to provide continuation training for RAF veterans as well as the next 
generation of Rhodesian pilots, so that there was no break in 
continuity. 29 In October 1954, after the formation of the Federation 
the SRAF became the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF). The RRAF 
was, in its turn, organizationally separated from the Army to become a 
service in its own right in 1956.30 It should be mentioned that the 
Rhodesian Air Force was an overwhelmingly white organization 
throughout its history and remained so for a time even after Rhodesia 
became Zimbabwe. 
29 Brelsford, Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, p. 673. 
30 "Her Majesty The Queen was graciously pleased to approve the addition of the 
prefix 'Royal' to the name of the Rhodesian Air Force ... " A Brief History of the Rhodesia 
Army, p. 14. 
CHAPTER X 
DIFFICULT ALLIES; 
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Second World War 
The question that begs answering is why Southern Rhodesia, 
South Africa and Britain did not bind themselves sooner in an alliance 
to face the common threat posed by Italian ambitions. The simple 
answer is that South Africa was not that friendly with Britain despite 
her being a British Dominion. It is also worth while pointing out that 
the German threat was not seen as that important or relevant to 
Afrikaner nationalists, very much as the position had been at the 
beginning of the First World War, and they were less than enthusiastic 
about lining up to defend British interests in Africa. It was only when 
the Axis menace began to appear to threaten South African interests 
that opinion among the nationalists shifted, but only slightly. 
Relations between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had 
never been close. If Rhodesians were wary of Africans with whom they 
had fought a little over forty years before, they were equally distrustful 
of much of what was going on in the Union, the rulers of which they 
had fought against more recently than they had fought the Ndebele 
and Mashona. 
Rising Afrikaner nationalism had been one of the chief reasons 
for the Rhodesian electorate's rejection of incorporation of Southern 
Rhodesia into the Union as its fifth province in 1923, despite a 
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generous offer by the South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts. 1 The 
man who was to become the first Prime Minister of Southern 
Rhodesia, Sir Charles Coghlan, voiced the opinion of many British 
settlers in Africa when he told Winston Churchill, then Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, that ... 
'we in Rhodesia wished to have no part or lot (in the Union of 
South Africa) which had apparently the constitutional right, and 
so far as the Dutch element was concerned, all the will, to cut us 
adrift from the British flag', and he went on to startle the new 
Secretary of State with an assurance that 'we will not part from 
the British flag without ftghting'. 2 
The matter for Rhodesians was becoming complicated by the 
change in the assumptions of the Colonial Office on the subject of 
white settlement in Africa, a process that had been going on since the 
early post-First World War period.3 This was also the period when 
South African territorial acquisitiveness was at its height with the 
South African Party government under Smuts, fresh from the virtual 
incorporation of South West Africa into the Union, attempting and 
failing to entice Southern Rhodesia, and trying to annex the High 
Commission Territories. 4 Smuts had hoped that the conquest of 
German East Africa by Union forces would lead Portugal to a territorial 
swap for southern Mozambique, so that South Africa could annex the 
1 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa. A Modern Historv, p. 188. 
2 Oliver Ransford, The Rulers of Rhodesia, p. 310. 
3See L.H. Gann, A Histocy of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953, Chapter 8 
for a more complete discussion of the question of Rhodesian Amalgamation and 
changing British attitudes. 
4 The British territories of Bechuanaland (present day Botswana), Basutoland 
(present day Lesotho), and Swaziland. Basutoland is surrounded by South Africa and 
Swaziland is virtually surrounded by South Africa. 
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capital, Lourenc;o Marques (now Maputo) and the territory all the way 
up to Beira, which was Southern Rhodesia's port and rail outlet to the 
Indian Ocean.5 This in turn would have made the incorporation of 
Southern Rhodesia easier and logical. 
In the last resort, these bids for territorial expansion had failed 
because Imperial support had been withdrawn. The new 
doctrine of paramountcy of African interests, which had been 
clearly expressed by the Duke of Devonshire in relation to Kenya 
in 1923, lay behind the British attitude. It formed no part of 
Smuts' vision, for Smuts had come to look upon the extension of 
'a great White Africa along the Eastern backbone, with railway 
and road communications connecting north and south', as a 
necessary guarantee for the long-term security of the white 
south.6 
Given the attitude of South Africa it was logical that Britain 
should turn to Southern Rhodesia for help and cooperation. Until the 
close military cooperation between Britain and Southern Rhodesia in 
the years leading up to the Second World War, as Major Hudson's 
Memorandum to the 1926 Defense Act pointed out, Southern 
Rhodesia's defense forces' only concern was internal security. Had 
there not been a threat from Italy, or had South Africa been closer to 
Britain sooner, it is entirely possible that Southern Rhodesia would not 
have acquired the military expertise that it did. The War Office, 
through the CID-ODC, not being affected by the growing concerns in 
the Colonial Office about settler states, naturally placed Southern 
Rhodesia in the context of an African defense strategy. 
It is also possible that the British would have taken a less active 
interest in the kind of rationalization that it was attempting to impose 
5 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa. A Modem History, pp. 189. 
6 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa. A Modem History, pp. 190. 
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on the various territories under her control and the post-Second 
World War Central African Federation may never have come into 
existence. In 1937 a Royal Commission under Lord Bledisloe, under 
the auspices of the Colonial Office, examined the possibility some type 
of closer political relationship between Southern Rhodesia, Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which would have the effect of bringing 
political and military questions under one authority. The Bledisloe 
Commission was considering the possibility of a fusion of all three 
under Southern Rhodesia, or dividing Northern Rhodesia between 
Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland or maintaining the political and 
administrative status quo, but with closer coordination of common 
services, such as customs, posts and telegraphs. 7 The result of the 
policy of accommodating Rhodesian political aspirations may now 
seem strange, but the CID-ODC's attitude was, as previously stated, 
that. .. 
Southern Rhodesia is predominantly an area for white 
settlement, and the African population, which is relatively small 
compared with that in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, is 
mainly concentrated in native reserves. 8 
The CID-ODC was unconcerned with the political or social state 
of affairs in Southern Rhodesia. They were concerned with national 
security and Southern Rhodesia's rapid development into a minor but 
effective regional military power took precedence and could only be 
for the good. This concern extended to Southern Rhodesia's 
preoccupation about raising African units. The success of the RAR may 
7 OOC Minute No. 300, 1938, p. 7. PRO CAB 10/9. 
8 OOC Minute No. 300, 1938, p. 1. PRO CAB 10/9. 
have had an additional beneficial effect on the willingness of the 
British to the establishment of the Federation: 
The Oversea Defense Committee consider that whatever 
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decision is finally taken regarding the closer association of the 
three Territories, their defensive organization must continue to 
provide coordinated arrangements to ensure the maintenance of 
local internal security, resistance to invasion, and the maximum 
possible support to other African dependencies in the event of 
attack by a hostile Power, or of internal disorder on a large scale. 
The Committee are of the opinion that this can only be 
achieved by the retention of the existing African units, upon 
which the coordination of defense in East and Central Africa 
depends, and by adequate measures for the training of white 
leaders.9 
When the war came both Southern and Northern Rhodesia were 
profiting as much from the war in terms of economic growth as well 
as the alliance with Britain. The military demand for Northern 
Rhodesian copper, and other strategic materials, was such that the 
British established a Ministry of Supply in 1939 in order to conclude 
bulk agreements with producers. 10 While it took copper out of the free 
market for the duration of the war, it also guaranteed Northern 
Rhodesia a stable market and made the necessity of a happy 
relationship between Rhodesians and the British a matter of national 
importance, which can only have increased their political leverage. 
When, in 1940, the governments of Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland decided that they wanted no part of a proposed East African 
Economic Council deciding instead that their interests lay in a closer 
association with Southern Rhodesia, they were encouraged by the 
Dominion Office " ... which stressed Southern Rhodesia's fine war 
9 ODC Minute No. 300, 1938, p. 8. PRO CAB 10/9. 
10 L.H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia; Early Days to 1953, p. 329. 
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effort, and the need not to alienate Huggins, and also from Sir Henry 
Moore, the Governor of Kenya, who was perturbed about the growth of 
Union [of South Africa] influence in East Africa."11 This attitude also 
went against the continuing evolution of the Colonial Office's attitude 
about the 'paramountcy' of African over settler interests. The attitude 
of the British political left had also been changing in its attitude 
towards settlers so that by the time the Bledisloe Commission, which 
was to decide the future of Rhodesian union, came out, it " ... 'funked 
the issue' on all the essentials. "12 The report seems to have been an 
exercise in recapping the political, social and economic policies and 
issues of the three territories without recommending any radical 
changes in the status quo. Opinion within the Bledisloe Commission 
was not unanimous and the ideas of fusion and federation reflected 
some of the changed attitudes and foreshadowed the controversy that 
would welcome the creation of the Federation the end of the war: 
... Orr Ewing on the other hand considered amalgamation 
desirable but not inevitable, whereas Fitzgerald, a Colonial Office 
man to the core, felt that His Majesty's Government should not 
as yet commit itself to the principle of amalgamation, in view of 
the alleged failings of Southern Rhodesian native policies. 13 
Britain's intimacy with the Rhodesians contrasted sharply with 
the lack of a relationship with South Africa. Opinion within the Union 
was sharply divided over involvement in the war, but it was vital for 
Britain that the various strategic assets of South Africa become part of 
the Allied cause. Not only did the Union control the route around the 
11 L.H. Gann, A Histoiy of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953, p. 353. 
12 L.H. Gann, A Histoiy of Northern Rhodesia; Early Days to 1953, p. 276. 
13 L.H. Gann, A Histoiy of Northern Rhodesia; Early Days to 1953, p. 276. 
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Cape, between east and west, at a time when the Suez Canal was under 
threat by the war in Egypt and Libya, but South Africa was a source of 
raw materials. It was the most important gold producer in the Sterling 
area, and had a well-developed industrial base. 14 
South Africa, with its much larger white population, had an 
army, an air force and a navy.15 The Union Defense Force (UDF) was, 
despite Colored (mixed race) and Asian support units, a white fighting 
force. During the Second World War the UDF fielded two full army 
divisions, one of which, the 6th (South African) Armored Division, was 
one of the largest Allied formations of the war. 
The man in charge of South Africa during the war was the 
legendary Boer War Commando leader, Jan Smuts who had been South 
African Prime Minister once before from 1919 to 1924 and had tried 
to entice Southern Rhodesia into the Union. 16 Once again, a campaign 
was afoot, of uncertain intensity, to expand South Africa's influence 
northward. 
'Pan-Africanism' was in the air, but Pan-Africanism in Southern 
Africa was then mainly used to denote a white man's cause, 
involving the extension of the Union's influence beyond its 
borders, and the creation of larger territorial units, concepts 
which were put forward especially by Smuts' adherents in the 
14 L.H. Gann, A Histoty of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953, p. 353. 
15 The South African Air Force (SAAF), whose members served in the Western 
Desert and Italy in the RAF, did not use the title 'Royal' like the other Dominions' Air 
Forces and it used the army, as opposed to the RAF, rank structure. 
16 "In August 1922 Smuts made what seemed to him a successful tour of 
[Southern) Rhodesia, although many Rhodesians thought he should have kept away 
from an issue they regarded as domestic. There was general hilarity when he asserted he 
had come but as a simple tourist. It made him realize however that his prospects were 
not good: 'They are afraid of our bilingualism, our nationalism, my views of the British 
Empire. In short they are little Jingoes'." Ronald Hyam, The Failure of South African 
Expansion. 1908-1948, p. 67. 
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Afrikaans propaganda. 17 
Britain and South Africa were also still involved in their long 
running dispute about the future of the High Commission Territories, 
although Smuts was not as anxious as he had once been to see them 
joined to the Union. "In 1943 Smuts showed no disposition to raise 
the issue, agreeing that it should definitely be suspended. "18 Bringing 
it up during the war, given Britain's precarious position and the 
relative military strength of Sou th Africa would only worry the 
Rhodesians, whom he was anxious not to alienate despite their 
newfound friendship. He hoped that at the end of the war South Africa 
"could bring widespread administrative and territorial changes in 
Africa." 19 although it does not seem to have been spelled out in any 
detail other than a vague hope. 
Posing as an 'African apostle', determined to promote 'African 
interests' and development to the north in the interests of all 
races, he envisaged the possibility of some vast federal structure 
rivaling the United States of America. If he could induce Britain 
to link up some of her 'fragments' in east and central Africa, a 
new large state to the north might be coaxed into partnership 
with South Africa. In such a scheme, the High Commission 
Territories were relatively small and unimportant, and he was 
perhaps genuinely concerned not to let them develop into a 
bone of contention. 20 
The goodwill of the Union's contribution towards the war effort 
could only have been offset by these disputes. They can only have 
17 L.H. Gann, A Histozy of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953, p. 353. 
18 Ronald Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion. 1908-1948, p. 175. 
19 Ronald Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion. 1908-1948, p. 1 75. 
20 Ronald Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion. 1908-1948, p. 175. 
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helped the British to decide that the best way of countering any 
Afrikaner ambitions was the counter-balance of a united Rhodesia, 
which had been so faithful for so long. Smuts' hopes were in vain; in 
1948 his government fell, the Nationalist Party under Dr. Daniel F. 
Malan came to power, and the Rhodesian dream of dominion status 
saw brief light with the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in 1953. 
The lack of cooperation and hostility by a large portion of 
Afrikaners is also illustrated by the 1934 visit to South Africa of Sir 
Maurice Hankey, Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defense, 
while on a trip to Australia and New Zealand. He received such a 
hostile reception from the nationalist Afrikaans press, suspicious that 
South Africa would become involved once again in a British-led war, 
that he insisted that the visit was private, as his wife was South 
African. A 'courtesy' call on Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog did not put 
the right wing press off the scent. In a letter to the British High 
Commissioner, Sir Herbert J. Stanley, Hankey expressed a desire to 
speak to Hertzog on the subject of defense, especially British air 
defense proposals: 
At their last meeting before the Parliamentary Adjournment the 
Cabinet instructed me to see the Prime Minister of each of the 
Dominions during my visit and to communicate personally how 
the Inquiry on Imperial Defense now stands. 
Whereas in my former letters I was only asking to see General 
Hertzog for personal reasons, I now have to make to him a 
rather important communication in connection with the above 
subject. I should be much obliged, therefore, if you could arrange 
that, if possible, I should have rather a long interview. If General 
Hertzog is not in Pretoria I would, of course, go to his farm, or 
to anywhere else to see him. 
I do not know whether it will be necessary for you to tell him 
the subject on which I am to speak to him. It has occurred to 
me, after hearing of the effect in the Press of the Durban Naval 
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Visit and Conference, that possibly it would be more convenient 
not to mention the subject to General Hertzog unless it is 
necessary. But you will be the best judge of that.21 
The Nationalists, however, became worried about German and 
Italian intentions in Africa during the late 1930s, especially after Italy 
had conquered and annexed Ethiopia in 1935-36. Italian Somaliland, 
Eritrea and Ethiopia were joined together to form the single entity of 
Italian East Africa which all but surrounded British Somaliland and 
covered almost the entire northern border of Kenya. Germany, now 
well under the control of Adolf Hitler, was making noises about the 
return of Tanganyika and South West Africa, both League of Nation 
mandate territories, with the latter all but incorporated into the 
Union of South Africa. 
The Union's Minister of Defense, Oswald Pirow, however " ... a 
personable white supremacist and versatile outdoor man ... "22 was, like 
many members of the National Party, mesmerized by Nazi Germany, so 
that even while the Union declared war on Germany, there were many 
South Africans, like Pirow, who took the attitude that South Africa 
should have no part in the war: 
... whites who felt that the preservation of the existing race-caste 
structure was necessary for European survival in the sub-
continent, or who were emotionally drawn to the Germans as to 
near-kinsmen, or who were excited by the energy or the 
doctrines of Nazi Germany, either backed the Axis or demanded 
a return to neutrality.23 
21 Commonwealth Defense Co-operation: visit of Sir Maurice Hankey to 
Dominions, 1934. PRO DO 119I1048 
22 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa. A Modem History, p. 215. 
23 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa. A Modem History, p. 234. 
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Pirow, however, expressed worries about the possibility of 
having to return South West Africa to Germany and having a potential 
enemy just across the border: 
He is in the best positions for knowing that South Africa will dig 
her toes in to the last over German South West, but he is afraid 
that we might be chivalrous about Tanganyika. If that were to 
happen, having no illusions about his German kinsmen, he 
realizes that the Union would have a constant menace from the 
north-east. he points out that Kenya would be between the upper 
and nether millstones as between Italy and Germany and he has 
at one time or another touched upon the possibilities of a 
defense conference between the Union and our Central African 
Colonial Governments. In fact we recently reported to the 
Dominions Office that Pirow had mentioned to the Naval 
Intelligence Officer that he proposed to take the opportunity 
provided by the forthcoming Pan-African Transportation 
Conference to discuss defense issues. 24 
South Africa's entry into the war in September 1939 was not a 
forgone conclusion. Prime Minister Hertzog pushed for South African 
neutrality and Smuts, the Deputy Prime Minister, pushed for a 
declaration of war. The vote in the South African parliament that 
brought defeat for Hertzog and Smuts to power as Prime Minister for 
the second time in his career and war with Germany, did not 
completely reassure Britain that South Africa was a completely safe 
ally, especially in the early days of the war when German victory was 
not uncertain. 
An example of British concern was shown in a "Secret and 
Personal" letter written on the 4th of September, 1940 by General Sir 
Archibald Wavell, then the British commander in Egypt, to the High 
Commissioner in Pretoria, Sir Edward Harding. In it he asks Harding 
24 Secret Letter from Sir W.H. Clark to the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir 
H.J. Stanley, 22 April 1936. PRO CAB 21/642. 
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to send him ... 
. . . periodical reports on the political situation in South Africa and 
the general feeling there, particularly in regard to military 
matters. With South African troops in my Command I should like 
to know how you think things are going and what difficulties 
Smuts is having. A short report from you every two or three 
weeks would be most valuable.25 
In his reply Harding promises to send periodic reports, but feels 
that he can not forward copies to Kenya where the British had set up 
an intelligence gathering operation because: 
... there is such close coordination between the Union and 
United Kingdom forces in Kenya that it is possible that some of 
these reports might come to the notice of Union officers. As the 
reports made from time to time contain forecasts of the policy 
of the Union Government based on information obtained in 
confidence, or comments on members of the Union 
Government, or on Union officials, it is highly desirable that 
there should be no possibility of this happening. 26 
After giving an overview of the situation of families of servicemen 
who had been evacuated to South Africa, the harmonious relationship 
between the British forces and the UDF, Harding concludes: 
Smuts is himself convinced that he now has the internal 
situation well in hand. The civilian population has been 
disarmed; he has in all over 105,000 men, all of them 
volunteers, in the military forces; and the actively hostile 
elements are disunited. But while the great majority of the 
opposition would not be likely to convert words into deeds, 
there is a reckless minority of extremists who are concentrating 
on stirring up trouble however and wherever they can, and 
particularly in the Mines. 
The difficulty in the Mineworkers' Union, as in the public 
service and the railways is, of course, that the most loyal 
elements have now joined up, and that the proportion of hostile 
elements is, therefore larger than at the beginning of the war. 
And the extremists are succeeding in stirring up more real 
feelings of bitterness than have prevailed here for many years. 
25 Letter from Wavell to Harding, 4 September 1940. PRO DO 119I1134 
26 Letter from Harding to Wavell, 12 October 1940. PRO DO 119I1134 
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So long, however, as Smuts remains in control there is 
probably no need to worry unduly about South Africa. The danger 
of course is the extent to which everything depends on one 
man, comparatively old in years but, as you know, exceedingly 
young in mind and spirit.21 
Despite the simmering hostility from the Afrikaner right, the 
change of atmosphere was immediately noticed by the British and the 
Rhodesians as the new South African administration communicated 
their desire to meet with Rhodesian Prime Minister Huggins " ... to 
clear up petty difficulties which have been an irritating factor in 
relations between Union and Southern Rhodesia under the Hertzog 
regime." and " ... to establish a firm basis of cooperation between the 
two Governments in the event of trouble in North Africa." 
Prime Minister [Smuts], he said, was well aware of distrust 
aroused in Southern Rhodesia by ambiguous attitude of Union 
Government in recent years and was anxious to do his best by 
following a good neighbor policy to repair the damage done in 
the past and to build up a new feeling of confidence between the 
two countries for the future. Prime Minister hoped that, now 
that the show down had occurred in the Union and had resulted 
in placing in power a Government resolutely opposed to any 
weakening of the Union's position as a member of the British 
Commonwealth, there would be a ready response from Southern 
Rhodesia.28 
Even while these encouraging words were being communicated, 
Sir W.H. Clark's telegram went on to reassure the British that fears of 
South African motivations were not justified: 
I do not think that there is any reason for apprehension that 
Prime Minister's motives go further than this, i.e. that he has in 
mind possibility that presence of South African troops in Central 
and East Africa in time of war might be used to enforce a claim 
for closer connection later. (After all, South African troops 
27 Letter from Harding to Wavell, 12 October 1940. PRO DO 119 I 1134 
28 Telegram from the High Commissioner, Pretoria to the Secretary of State, 
London 20November1939. PRO DO 119/1114. 
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fought in East Africa in last war). Some of his followers, I know, 
look to Southern Rhodesia whose incorporation in the Union 
would they consider remove for all time all possibility of Dutch 
[Afrikaner] ascendancy (and this feeling may become 
increasingly strong as the war develops) ... 
Would you please communicate this to Stanley [Southern 
Rhodesia's governor] since I possess no cipher for 
communicating with him which Union Government do not also 
hold ... 29 
Smuts, always the diplomat, reassured the Rhodesians that the ... 
"Main object in inviting Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to pay a 
visit to Pretoria was to pave the way for improved relations ... and to 
secure closer cooperation particularly in defense matters. There was 
no intention of forcing the pace in the discussions which it was agreed 
should be purely exploratory."30 The resulting visit on the 27th of 
November to Pretoria by Prime Minister Huggins and Defense 
Minister Tredgold was a success ... "They seem to have been agreeably 
impressed with the change of atmosphere (as affecting Southern 
Rhodesia) which has taken place since the Smuts regime came into 
being. "31 
After the outbreak of war, it soon became obvious that the Union 
of South Africa would play an important part in Southern Rhodesia's 
military history and development. With the Allied victory in North 
Africa and the reduction of the Japanese threat in the Indian Ocean by 
the end of 1943, the danger of the Colony becoming directly involved 
29 Telegram from the High Commissioner, Pretoria to the Secretacy of State, 
London 20 November 1939. PRO DO 119I1114. 
30 Telegram No. 372 from the High Commissioner, Pretoria to the Secretary of 
State, London 8 December 1939. PRO DO 119/ 1114. 
31 Telegram No. 397 /39 from the High Commissioner, Pretoria to the Secretary 
of State, London 14 December 1939. PRO DO 119/1114. 
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in the war had all but vanished. A change in direction for Southern 
Rhodesia's soldiers was imminent. ..For some considerable time there 
had been a growing feeling amongst Rhodesians serving in the 
Imperial forces, that they would prefer to be allowed to serve in the 
Union Defense Force. "32 
The negotiations with the UDF had been going on for many 
weeks in Pretoria and Salisbury ... It was there agreed that there 
should be no overlapping in the Commands of South and East Africa 
and that Southern Rhodesia should throw in her lot with one or the 
other. "33 Cooperation with the UDF was not new and had been under 
way since the Union entered the war in 1939 and was readily 
acknowledged by Southern Rhodesia's Military Forces Commander, 
Brigadier J.W. Watson ... 
We have worked on it for the past three years, admittedly in 
order to get a sound and balanced scheme of local defense 
embracing Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Union and 
Southern Rhodesia. This seemed such an obvious requirement to 
me that I never hesitated to pursue it. It must be very clear that 
in the case of attack on this country which might have occurred 
earlier in the war, though it is remote now, we should have been 
dependent on the Union for a great deal of assistance in many 
directions. 34 
A second reason was cost. Drafting their men through the UDF 
meant that Southern Rhodesia would not have to foot the bill for 
transporting their soldiers to the nearest British units, which had 
32 Report on Defense for 1943, p. 71. Southern Rhodesia Annual Reoort on 
Defense for 1939-45. British Library. 
33 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 2, pp. 
367-368. 
34 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 2, p. 
371. 
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been in Kenya and Egypt. 
Without exact figures, which I can obtain if necessary, they 
amount to approximately £100,000 so far during this war. Not 
only are we responsible for sending our men to the British Army 
but we pay all expenses of bringing them back. This is unlikely to 
be the case with the Union.35 
The positive aspects of the British connection were obvious. 
There were no guarantees that Rhodesians would have had the military 
exposure in the UDF that they were having through serving with the 
Imperial forces because of the agreements that they had had with the 
British in the years before the war: 
I am not disagreeing with past policy. It was right and I 
supported it fully, for it has enabled us to place nearly 600 
Rhodesians as commissioned officers in all sorts of Units in 
various commands. This would never have been possible had we 
sent large units of our own men on active service. Of course, this 
may well be accepted as a reason for not sending large units 
now, but the position in regard to the supply of leaders is not 
quite so pressing as it was ... 36 
It would appear that the Southern Rhodesian government was 
going to have everything its own way. The experience gained in the 
African Colonial forces could never have been achieved by allying 
themselves with the UDF. It is possible that the RAR would never have 
been formed and the political implications of such an early association 
with the South Africans might have hardened some British attitudes, 
even on the political right, about the viability of a central African 
federation based on Southern Rhodesia. 
It had also become apparent that not all Rhodesians would be 
35 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia, 1939-45, Vol. 2, p. 
371. 
36 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia, 1939-45, Vol. 2, pp. 
369-370. 
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suitable as leaders, especially where African soldiers were concerned, 
and that a place should be found for them. The ability to communicate 
with and lead soldiers into war across cultural, ethnic and social 
barriers requires special talents . 
. . . we are accumulating a fairly large number of men who will 
probably never be suitable for commissions during this war. It is 
for these men that we must cater now and endeavor to improve 
their conditions and satisfy their desire to serve together in 
Rhodesian units. 37 
Three reasons were outlined by the 1943 Defense Report which 
made no mention, except in passing, of a minor clash of cultures: 
(i) a greater affinity of Rhodesian soldiers for the Colonial troops 
in the 1st South African Division than existed between them and 
the Imperial troops with whom they had served; 
(ii) conditions of service in the UDF, which were more attractive 
to Rhodesians than were conditions of service in the Imperial 
Army. 
(ill) a better opportunity for Rhodesians to return to the Colony 
on leave if they were members of the UDF. 38 
There seems to have been some friction between some 
Rhodesians and their British hosts. 39 When Rhodesians were 
withdrawn from British units to be sent to South African units, the 
parting was not always regretted ... "Some had felt most unhappy on 
account of the air of cold aloofness and indifference with which a 
37 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia, 1939-45, Vol. 2, pp. 
369-370. 
38 Report on Defense for 1943, p. 71. Southern Rhodesia Annual Report on 
Defense for 1939-45. British Library. 
39 "In an accent-and class-conscious society, the Rhodesian accent was not 
highly esteemed in a British officers' mess of the traditional kind .... Regular soldiers in 
the ranks, on the other hand, widely came from the unskilled working class; white 
Rhodesian workers were all skilled." Letter from Dr. L.H. Gann, dated September 9th, 
1994. 
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small-minded minority of Regular officers met their friendly 
advances. "40 Some were finding that service with the British Army was 
not to their liking, "All evidence both direct and collateral indicates a 
desire on the part of at least 80 percent of Southern Rhodesians in 
Middle East to transfer to the Union forces ... "41 
Unless we enter fully into the Union scheme we are going to 
serve two masters, i.e., the British Army and the Union Defense 
Force. Unsatisfactory from many points of view, but a most fertile 
source of complaint from our men on active service. I am 
satisfied from letters I have received and conversations I have 
had that by placing all those who wish to go with the Union 
Defense Forces on active service, we shall remove, at any rate for 
a considerable period, the masses of grouses which we receive 
from our men serving in penny packets all over the Middle 
East.42 
Rhodesians would be sent to the 6th (South African) Armored 
Division, which was being formed in the Union after the withdrawal of 
the 1st (South African) Division from North Africa in 1943. ''The time, 
therefore, appeared opportune, if the policy were approved, not only 
to transfer Rhodesians serving in Imperial Forces to the UDF but also 
to draft all available men serving in the Colony to the UDF for inclusion 
in the new armored division"43 
The aim was to secure " ... Rhodesian armored squadrons in 
armored regiments, Rhodesian batteries in field and anti-tank 
40 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia, 1939-45, Vol. 1, p. 
155. 
41 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 2, pp. 
369-370. 
42 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia, 1939-45, Vol. 2, pp. 
369-370. 
43 Report on Defense for 1943, p. 71. Southern Rhodesia Annual Report on 
Defense for 1939-45. British Library. 
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regiments of artillery and Rhodesian companies in motor battalions. "44 
The fact that it was to be a voluntary decision, whether to transfer or 
not, meant that it was not always possible to keep Rhodesian units 
completely Rhodesian in character. Those Rhodesians who were in 
specialist roles would be sworn into the UDF and allowed to stay in the 
units they were already serving in. 45 
The Southern Rhodesian Director of Demobilization, Mr. William 
Addison, further reflected this reason for extending the relationship 
to South Africa. Sending Rhodesians to the UDF would satisfy those 
~cultural' needs of Rhodesian soldiers who, despite their pro-British 
feelings and identity, came from the same background as the South 
Africans: 
From my own experience, backed by the opinions of men with 
much closer and longer knowledge than myself, it would appear 
the war has thrown up a distinct Rhodesian type. He is in some 
respects different from the other Empire soldiers, and is 
naturally nearest to the South African and closely allied to the 
New Zealander, with whom in the desert there has always been 
frequent, close and happy contact. Not always, it must be 
admitted, has the contact between Rhodesians and certain types 
of the British Regular Officer and the prewar British Tommy 
been of the same harmonious nature ... 46 
There was, however, still a fear of the Afrikaner-dominated 
Union and the public had to be reassured, as the Bulawayo Chronicle of 
October 28th, 1942 pointed out, that an alliance with the Union would 
44 Report on Defense for 1943, p. 71. Southern Rhodesia Annual Report on 
Defense for 1939-45. British Library. 
45 Report on Defense for 1943, p. 71. Southern Rhodesia Annual Report on 
Defense for 1939-45. British Library. 
46 J.F. MacDonald, The War History of Southern Rhodesia. 1939-45, Vol. 2, pp. 
368-369. 
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not mean the end of Southern Rhodesia's independence: 
The Minister was at pains to explain that the change does not 
mean that ·in a military sense this Colony has been handed over 
bodily to the Union.' We do not believe there is any public fear on 
this score; it will be taken for granted that the military 
authorities of the Union will deal with the question of the 
defense of South Africa - or with any other military matters 
which may have to be decided - on the agreed basis of 
negotiation and arrangement. The decision taken is the obvious 
sound and sensible one from a military point of view, and that 
point of view was the one which should have and obviously was 
predominant. We share the Minister's view that ·u will be a 
source of great satisfaction to the Colony that from now onwards 
the general direction of its military affairs will be in the hands of 
one of the greatest soldiers and statesmen of our day,' but quite 
apart from the fact that Field Marshal Smuts is at the head of the 
Command, the wisest course was followed by our Government in 
doing what it did. 47 
Whether fortuitously or by design, Southern Rhodesia emerged 
from the Second World War in a very strong position to press forward 
with its agenda to become another Dominion in a federal relationship 
with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. How much the British would 
have been willing to allow Rhodesians to take the path that they 
followed had the two world wars never occurred is hard to say. What is 
certain is that the strategic relationship between the two benefited 
both sides and Rhodesia, on both sides of the Zambezi, emerged in a 
very strong position; militarily, economically and politically. 




the Beginning of the End 
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was the high tide of 
Rhodesian aspirations when it was inaugurated in 1953. The Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland Army and RRAF cooperated closely with Britain 
throughout the decade of the 1950s, in fact the entire regular infantry 
strength and a small white volunteer unit of the Army served under 
British command in the Malayan Emergency. There were joint 
exercises and most of the junior officers of the period received their 
initial training at Sandhurst. All of this gave Rhodesian soldiers 
considerable exposure and experience beyond what they already had 
from the Second World War.1 
For all of the experience of its units and individuals in the 
period leading up to UDI, the army had never operated as a force 
under a single command structure. It had always been an adjunct to a 
larger British or South African force. This is probably one of the 
reasons why its record in the Chimurenga War was so inconsistent, 
1 1 NRR was in Malaya from 1954 to 1955, 1RARfrom1956 to 1958. The 
Nyasaland battalions of the King's African Rifles ( 1 & 2 KAR) served in Malaya from 
1950 to 1952 and from 1952 to 1954 respectively. W.V. Brelsford, Handbook to the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, p. 670. The Southern Rhodesia Far East 
Volunteer Unit, which became 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 SAS Regiment, served in 
Malaya from 1951 to 1953. B. Cole, The Elite, pp. 7-13. 
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with its strengths lying at the tactical rather than the strategic level. 2 
The Staff Corps never became the kind of intellectual clearing house 
for ideas that it could have been, and this can be seen by its origins, 
which has been pointed out, as a system that 0 ••• served a static 
geographic spread by an admixture of BSAP and civil service 
procedures. "3 
This tradition of flexibility at unit level contrasted with 
organizational weaknesses, many of which had their origins in the 
formative period of the Army's history. The Rhodesian Army was 
hampered by the fact that it was never the senior service and was 
regarded as the nation's second line of defense after the BSAP. Where 
the Army's needs and wishes competed with those of the police, 
especially in the area of intelligence gathering, the Army lost. The fact 
of being ~the second son' meant that military intelligence was a key 
area where the army failed. Simply stated, there was no tradition of 
military intelligence in Southern Rhodesia's Army. 4 No such unit was 
raised in Southern Rhodesia for the Imperial war effort, with the 
result that no tradition was established of having one in the Army after 
the war. Tactical intelligence was gleaned from BSAP and police 
2 Hoffman, Taw & Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsur~encies, pp. 
13-18. 
3 Letter from Colonel Welch dated August 28, 1993. 
4 "Internal security and intelligence gathering remained the responsibility of 
the police Special Branch throughout the counterinsurgency campaign because of the 
symbiotic relationship between intelligence gathering operations and routine police 
investigation work." Hoffman, Taw & Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary 
Counterinsur2encies, p. 30. 
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Special Branch sources.5 
It is also interesting to note that the Rhodesian units raised 
during the Second World War reflected the expertise of Rhodesia's 
federal and later republican army. The armored and artillery 
capabilities and traditions of the Rhodesian Army are a case in point. It 
is not entirely certain how valuable they were, either in the 
Chimurenga War or before it in the federal period, but as both units 
had an existence, it gave them a constituency. The Governor-General's 
Troop, the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Artillery, was added to the Defense 
Force for ceremonial purposes in 1959 because ... 
The late Lord Llewellin, himself a "Gunner", had first suggested 
the formation of a Governor-General's Troop, on the style of the 
King's Troop, The Royal Horse Artillery, in the British Army. 6 
An argument can be made that they would have been useful had 
the war become a conventional conflict. The final reincarnation of 
these two battalion-sized units as 1 Field Regiment, Rhodesian 
Artillery (I FR) and the Rhodesian Armored Car Regiment (RhACR) 
had very little impact on the conduct of the Chimurenga War, despite 
their illustrious and useful record in the Second World War. Rhodesia's 
final struggle was, in fact, conducted by small, special force and light 
infantry units transported and deployed from the air and using close 
5 "One of the greatest weaknesses of the Rhodesian counterinsurgency campaign 
was its lack of emphasis on military intelligence." and "The Army developed no real 
independent intelligence capabilities and, until 1975, relied completely on Special 
Branch." Hoffman, Taw & Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsur~encies, p. 
28. 
6 Breslsford, The Handbook of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, p. 67 4. 
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air support. 7 
Because Southern Rhodesia inhabited a political reality whose 
permanence and ethos was very specific to a certain time and place in 
history, it is entirely possible that a certain complacency about the 
future would have permeated the military. As such, when the time 
came and the world moved on to newer and more radical political 
concepts, Rhodesia was left behind. Because the military organizations 
of any country are dependent on the prevailing political and social 
realities, it is not surprising that, with such a short time between 
foundation and its greatest test, the Rhodesian Security Forces 
struggled as much against itself as against the tide of African 
liberation. 
7 Hoffman, Taw & Arnold, Lessons for Contemporazy Coun terinsuriencies, gives 
an operational description of Rhodesian units involved in the conflict (RAR, RLI, SAS 
Selous Scouts, Greys' Scouts, BSAP, RhAF, etc.). Nowhere are the artillery or armored 
cars mentioned, pp. 55-57. 
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